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I examine the mechanism by which political ties influence domestic 
firms’ exit decisions following competitive foreign entry in a transition 
economy. Competition through the entry of MNCs in factor and product 
markets tends to crowd out domestic firms, whereas the same competitive 
pressures and knowledge spillovers can enhance domestic firms’ effectiveness 
and performance. Evaluating the strategic reactions and resources influencing 
domestic firms can provide better understanding of the impact of foreign entry 
on domestic firms.   
I focus on domestic firms’ choice to exit as a strategic reaction to 
foreign entry. Drawing from the resource-based view, I study how domestic 
firms’ likelihood of exit through acquisition or dissolution is influenced by 
one important boundary-spanning resource, firms’ political ties. Political ties 
are firms’ linkages with a country’s political system, which typically consists 
of the government, the parliament or its equivalent legislative and 
representative bodies, and political parties. Political ties provide firms with 
access to market information, external resources, and power, which can 
influence how and when firms react to competitive pressures from MNC entry. 
I distinguish between managerial ties, which are firm executives’ current or 
prior positional linkages with the political system, and organizational ties, 
which refer to organizational level affiliation with political institutions. My 
theory development is formed through three clusters of hypotheses. I first 
examine the main effects of political ties on firm exit; I then evaluate the 




impact of ties on exit is contingent on environmental factors such as 
development of legal effectiveness and market uncertainty. I test my 
hypotheses on a sample of 330 firms in the Chinese TV manufacturing 
industry over the 1993-2003 period. The Chinese TV industry experienced 
substantial foreign entry after it had developed substantially, allowing a 
conservative test of how political ties can moderate the impact of foreign entry.  
My results show that: (1) political ties significantly influence domestic 
firms’ likelihood and timing of exit in the face of foreign competition, 
increasing the likelihood of domestic firms being acquired and reducing their 
likelihood of dissolution; (2) the origin and destination of political ties 
influence their impact, with ties with more proximate origins and those with 
greater resources and power having significantly stronger impact on firms’ 
likelihood of being acquired; political ties that originate with organizations 
having more resources also have earlier impact on firms’ likelihood of being 
acquired; (3) political ties only influence exit through dissolution in the short 
run, suggesting that such ties have a limited life span and do not have a 
perpetual impact; and (4) political ties have a stronger effect in environment 
with lower macro-economic development and weaker legal effectiveness and 
market development, and in environment with higher level of uncertainty, 
such that connected firms are more likely to be acquired in less weaker 
institutional environment and highly uncertain environments.  
By decomposing the concept of political ties and providing detailed 
analyses of political ties and firm exit, this dissertation expands and enriches 
resource-based view of strategy by further expanding our understanding of 




study also improves understanding of the impact of domestic firms’ reactions 
to the entry of foreign competitors, pushes the research frontier from MNC-
focused paradigm to a new research stream on the other side of the 
competition dynamics, the local firms, and provides valuable implications for 
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FDI is an important driver of globalization. In recent years, 
governments, particularly those of developing economies, have offered 
significant inducements to attract FDI, as it is generally believed that the 
primary and spillover effects of FDI boost economic development. However, 
it remains less clear how domestic firms are affected by the entry of MNCs. 
The entry of foreign firms, which are often equipped with advanced 
technological and managerial know-how, increases competitive intensity in 
the host country, increasing the likelihood of crowding out some local firms or 
negatively affecting their market position. On the other hand, MNCs may also 
improve domestic firms through knowledge spillovers, expanding market size, 
creating supporting and complementary infrastructure, and improving resource 
allocation and utilization (Caves, 1974). Studies of FDI have tended to treat 
domestic firms as passive or even unimportant players in the host country, and 
have produced inconclusive findings of the impact of FDI on these firms 
across different contexts (Chang & Xu, 2006; Li & Shenkar, 1996).  
I argue that the impact of multinational corporations’ (MNC) entry on 
domestic firms is contingent on domestic firms’ resources and strategic 
reactions, and may vary over time as a function of the environment in which 
the competitive dynamics are taking place. At the extremes, the entry of 




of FDI on the domestic economy must consider such possible outcomes. 
Failing to consider domestic firms as active incumbent competitors to foreign 
entrants prevents a holistic view of FDI’s impact. In addition, the issue of how 
domestic firms respond to the entry of MNCs is an inherently important 
question, raising issues pertaining to competition and the impact of various 
classes of resources on firm strategy and performance.  
Many questions thus need to be answered. Do firms react to the entry 
of MNCs, and if so, how can domestic firms respond to competitive foreign 
entry? Will firms’ resources impact how firms react? What contingencies 
affect how firms’ react? In this dissertation, I will focus on domestic firms’ 
exit decisions as one important strategic reaction towards foreign entry (see 
Figure 1.1 for my research question). Calls have been made for examining 
value-creating resource beyond firm boundaries (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 
Nohria & Zaheer, 2000), such as incorporating political components into the 
resource-based view (RBV) (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Therefore, aiming 
to contributing to both the competition theory and RBV, I attempt to answer 
my previous questions by linking firms’ exit with an important boundary-
spanning resource, firms’ connections with political institutions – political ties.  
 
*** Figure 1.1 about here *** 
 
In this dissertation, I examine how formal political ties affect domestic 
firms’ exit decisions following competitive foreign entry in a transition 
economy. Firm entry and exit are issues underpinning the competitiveness of 




firm strategy. Knowing how domestic firms strategically respond to foreign 
entry is an important step to understand the impacts of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on the domestic firms and economy. This is a particularly 
important issue in transition economies as domestic firms might be crowded 
out and displaced by foreign players, thus impacting the transition process 
which typically includes privatization and restructuring (Hu & Jefferson, 2002; 
Kosova, 2004). Therefore, it is critical to understand how domestic firms 
respond to foreign entry in a transition economy, and what the determining 
factors are.  
Meanwhile, as a boundary-spanning, value-creating resource, political 
ties, i.e. business-government linkages, have not been systematically studied 
in this setting. My dissertation focuses on an important type of political ties, 
formal political ties. Formal ties are a relative term to informal ties, which 
arise from social relationships such as friendship and family ties. By formal 
political ties, I refer to firms’ affiliation with and firm executives’ current or 
prior positional linkages with the political institutions. My study aims to 
explore the relationships between political ties and firm exit following 
competitive foreign entry to foster deeper understanding of these issues.  
 
1.2 Motivation and Conceptual Overview 
 
1.2.1 Background and Motivation 
 
How FDI impacts the host country’s economy has long been an 




research stream is that domestic firms benefit from the entry of MNCs, 
although with substantial variation for firms in different host countries. Caves 
(1974) suggested three ways through which FDI improves domestic firms’ 
productivity, by (1) enabling more efficient resource allocation in the focal 
industry through competitive pressures; (2) inducing a higher level of 
technical efficiency (X-efficiency) in the focal and complementary industries; 
and (3) transferring technology to domestic firms.  
Recent research (Gorg & Greenaway, 2004) on the impact of FDI 
inflow on host economies concludes that positive spillovers from MNCs boost 
domestic firms’ productivity through four channels – imitation of production 
methods and managerial practices (Das, 1987; Wang & Blomstrom, 1992), 
skill and knowledge acquisition by workers (Haacker, 1999; Fosfuri, et al., 
2001), competition for X-efficiency (Wang & Blomstrom, 1992; Glass & 
Saggi, 2002), and exports as an indirect gain (Aitken, et al., 1997; Barrios et 
al., 2003).  
A parallel line of reasoning rooted in Industrial Organization (IO) 
economics argues that the entry of MNCs may threaten domestic firms’ 
position in the market. Increased competition from new entrants threatens an 
incumbent’s position in the market as well as its access to resources, which 
may in turn affect its survival and profitability (Scherer, 1980). Caves (1996) 
agrees that MNCs’ proprietary assets and their cost or revenue-productivity 
advantages over domestic firms can drive the latter out of the market, or 
marginalize them. Aitken and Harrison (1999) argue that though technology 
spillovers may exist, more efficient foreign firms may draw demand from less 




of the market. Therefore, MNC entry can improve domestic firms’ allocative 
and technical efficiency, but increase the  threat of market share and 
profitability declines.  
Empirical work in this area was pioneered by Caves (1974), 
Globerman (1979), and Blomstrom (1986). Caves (1974) found a positive 
spillover effect at the industry level based on cross-sectional data in 1966. 
Following Caves, other studies (e.g. Globerman, 1979; Blomstrom & Persson, 
1983; Blomstrom, 1986; Li, Liu & Parker, 2001) consistently found a positive 
link between FDI and host country productivity using industry-level data. 
Their results show that (short-term) positive FDI spillovers exist in developing 
(e.g. Mexico), developed (e.g. Australia and Canada), and transition 
economies (e.g. China). All these studies used cross-sectional data and tested 
the FDI-local productivity at the industry level, obviating the consideration of 
differences in influences across heterogeneous domestic firms.  
Studies using firm- and plant-level data, however, reveal a more 
complex picture of the FDI-productivity relationship. Some found a positive 
effect (e.g. Blomstrom & Harrison, 1999; Djankov & Hoekman, 2000; 
Zukowska-Gagelmann, 2000), and others no effect (e.g. Kathuria, 2000; 
Harris & Robinson, 2004; Kinoshita, 2001). For instance, studying firms in 
Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that foreign investment 
negatively affects the productivity of domestically owned plants and the gains 
from foreign investment seem to be entirely captured by joint ventures. Using 
cross-section data for 1995, Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2002) found that non-
Chinese MNCs generated technological and international market access 




not provide technological spillover benefits; state-owned enterprises received 
negative spillover from MNCs whereas collectively-owned firms gained from 
foreign entrants. These studies highlight the importance of firm – both MNC 
and domestic – heterogeneity.  
A review of this literature suggests three possible reasons for the 
divergent arguments and findings. First, many studies suffer from a survivor 
bias, as they do not evaluate firms that exited after the entry of MNCs. 
Therefore, those studies that based their analyses only on survived firms tend 
to overestimate the positive effect of foreign entry on domestic firms and 
economy. Despite its importance as a distinct and tractable measure of firm 
performance (e.g. Barnard, 1947; Mitchell, 1991), firm survival has not been 
systematically analyzed in this research setting (Kosova, 2004). Gorg and 
Strobl (2000), De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003), and Kosova (2004) are the 
only studies that have analyzed the impact of FDI on firm survival or exit.  
Second, prior research has generally not considered the influence of 
context on the impact of foreign entry. The evidence for positive foreign 
impact such as technology spillover on domestic firms broadly prevails across 
developed countries (Keller & Yeaple, 2003; Haskel et al., 2001), whereas 
studies in developing countries show rather negative impact from FDI (Aitken 
& Harrison, 1999; Kathuria, 2000).  
Third, improved understanding of the impact of FDI requires an 
evaluation of domestic firms as active competitors to the foreign entrants, as 
the outcomes of foreign competition are contingent on the resources and 
strategies of domestic players. Theoretically, it is important to study the 




MNC perspective. Child (1994) warns that researchers have failed to link the 
MNC’s perspective with studies of domestic firms. Li and Shenkar (1996) also 
argues that treating local partners as passive providers of relief for MNCs from 
local customers, biases and regulations is one of the major problems in 
international business research. Luo (2000), studying Chinese domestic firms’ 
IJV partner selection behavior, calls for more attention to domestic firms, 
especially their strategic behavior, economic rationale, and business policies. 
Despite the importance of domestic firms’ strategic motives and reactions in 
the MNC-local competitive dynamics, empirical work adopting a domestic 
firm’s perspective is scarce, warranting great research opportunity in this field.   
 
1.2.2 An Overview 
 
The central issue in this dissertation is the exit strategies of domestic 
firms following competitive foreign entry. The issue is an important one, as 
FDI, particularly into emerging economies, continues to be a source of major 
economic and business change in host economies. Extensive research on the 
benefits of FDI for host country economic growth (e.g. Aitken & Harrison, 
1999; Caves, 1974, 1996; Gorg & Greenaway, 2004), has been followed by a 
recent stream addressing benefits of FDI on MNCs (e.g. Singh, 2003). 
Although many studies have examined the effect of foreign presence, “we 
know basically nothing about competition between domestic and foreign 
firms” (Kosova, 2004: 3), especially how domestic firms react to the entry of 
MNCs. Yet, this reaction is central to the issue of the FDI impacts to the host 




competitive foreign entry, and what factors influence their reaction and 
subsequent performance outcomes are of paramount importance for firm and 
industry development, as well as for policy makers. In order to achieve long-
term growth of the national economy, policy makers need to look closer at 
how domestic players are affected by the inflows of FDI, and tailor their FDI 
policies to promote the growth of indigenous firms (Huang & Khanna, 2003).  
This is a particularly important concern for developing and transition 
economies, due to the important role played by MNCs in the technological and 
economic development in these countries (e.g. Meyer, 2004). On the other 
hand, however, domestic firms in transition economies are often least able to 
react to or deal with the entry of MNCs. Accustomed to operations and 
competition based on the scale and efficiencies of the domestic standard, firms 
in transition economies will face the challenge of competing against large 
firms with greater access to resources, markets, and experience. Most of the 
empirical studies focused on domestic firms in developed economies, 
particularly the U.S., suggesting the need for research in transition economies, 
which are attractive FDI host countries and which have domestic firms most 
vulnerable to the entry of MNCs. In a transition economy, along with the 
liberalization and economic reform process, how domestic firms react to the 
MNC entry becomes a particularly interesting and important question for the 
industry and national economy development (White & Linden, 2002).  
As a response to calls for deeper understanding of firms’ boundary-
spanning relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000) 
and the recent surge of interest in business-government interface (Chung, 




2006; Siegel, 2007; Peng, Lee & Wang, 2004; Rettberg, 2001), this 
dissertation evaluates the role of an important firm resource, formal political 
ties, in domestic firms’ choice of exit in response to competitive foreign entry 
in transition economies. Formal ties are a relative term to informal ties, which 
arise from social relationships such as friendship and family ties. By formal 
political ties, I refer to firms’ affiliation with and firm executives’ current or 
prior positional linkages with the political institutions. Despite substantial 
research effort on firms’ linkages with the government (Peng & Luo, 2000; Li 
& Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Xin & Pearce, 1996), little attention was paid to 
firms’ actual ties, but rather, managerial perception of ties or efforts used to 
cultivate ties, which is hard to capture a holistic view on business-government 
interface. It is therefore important to place greater attention on the more 
observable ties originating of firms (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnel, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Siegel, 2007).   
This study draws from several streams of research: the competition 
theory, the resource-based view, social capital theory, and political economics. 
My central arguments are that: (1) domestic firms’ ties with political 
institutions influence their likelihood of exit in response to competitive foreign 
entry; I distinguish between two modes of exit, being acquired or dissolution, 
(2) ties at different organizational levels (i.e. origins) and linked to different 
political agencies (i.e. destinations) are likely to cast different influences on 
firm exit and the timing of their impact may vary, (3) political ties may have 
different impact on firm exit across different environments, and the effects of 
political ties are likely to vary with economic development, institutional 




I explore my hypotheses on a sample of 330 firms in the Chinese TV 
manufacturing industry in the 1993 to 2003 period. This is a suitable context, 
as the TV manufacturing industry in China experienced the relatively late and 
sudden entry of MNCs, permitting my analyses without extensive “left-
censoring”. The Chinese TV industry received substantial foreign investment 
during the period of my study, leading to sufficient domestic-foreign 
competitive dynamics. The entry of foreign firms in this industry also took 
place after the domestic industry had grown and developed to the point of 
approaching international standards of design, technological and operating 
efficiencies. This allows a focus on the competitive aspects of the foreign-
domestic interaction rather than the technological ones.  
The empirical results broadly support my hypotheses. First, both 
organizational and managerial ties have significant effects on firm exit, 
facilitating firms’ decision to be acquired and preventing them from dissolving. 
Second, the origin and destination of political ties influence their impact: ties 
with more proximate origins and greater resources and power have 
significantly stronger impact on firms’ likelihood of being acquired; political 
ties that originate with organizations having more resources also have earlier 
impact on firms’ likelihood of being acquired. Moreover, political ties only 
influence exit through dissolution in the short run, suggesting that such ties 
have a limited life span. Finally, political ties have a stronger effect on exit in 
less developed economic and weaker institutional environment, and in more 






1.3 Overview of Contributions  
 
This study makes important theoretical contribution. First and most 
important would be my contribution to studies on political ties as a firm 
resource. By highlighting that political resources in the form of formal ties 
with the political system can be valuable, my dissertation expands and 
enriches resource-based view of strategy by “adding a political component that 
is largely missing in that literature, which ignores political resources and 
competitive methods” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 135). Next, I decompose 
the concept of political ties and conduct detailed analyses on ties at different 
levels, and ties with different origins and destinations, which are broadly 
missing in the extant literature (Chung, Mahmood and Mitchell, 2008). 
Further, from a strategic perspective, I address the foreign-domestic dynamics 
from the angle of domestic firms, pushing the research frontiers from 
multinational perspective to domestic firm perspective.  
This study has important managerial implications by providing insights 
into competitive reaction and implications for both domestic and foreign firms. 
My study also has implications for FDI policies, competition policies and 
regulations to support domestic industries. A policy priority of many 
governments is to attract FDI, as it is generally believed that FDIs have the 
potential to contribute to the economic development of the host country 
through primary and various secondary channels. However, these policies 
focused on attracting FDI may not be justified, especially at the firm level and 
in developing countries, if the entry of MNCs cause substantial exit of 




industry. If policy interventions are able to influence the amount of FDI inflow, 
it is critical for policy makers to attract FDI while at the same time create an 
encouraging environment to promote the growth of domestic firms.  
 
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 
 
In this section, I describe my research background and motivation, and 
identify the research question and context for my study. The rest of this 
dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, I review the core 
concepts and studies that provide the theoretical foundation of my study. In 
Chapter 2, I first discuss literatures on market entry and incumbent 
competitive reaction, and then go on to examine the mechanism through which 
an incumbent’s strategic reactions relate to its resource. I next review the core 
concepts in resource-based view (RBV) and respond to prior scholars’ call for 
a more systematical analysis on firms’ boundary-spanning resources. Next, I 
introduce my key concepts, political ties, and discuss firms’ political ties as a 
resource and how this resource will influence firm strategy.  
I form my propositions and hypotheses in Chapter 3. This hypothesis 
section can be naturally divided into three sections. I discuss the main effects 
in the first section. I first propose that a domestic firm’s political ties will 
affect the firm’s strategic reaction, such as their choice of exit, distinguishing 
exit through dissolution and exit through acquisition. I then discuss in greater 
detail how different types of political ties influence domestic firms’ choice of 
exit strategy following MNC entry, distinguishing the origin and destination of 




to influence the main effects. The first contingency factor I study is timing: 
since when the effects of political ties start to kick in and until when will these 
effects fade. Finally, I explore the varying effects of political ties across 
environment with different macro-economic conditions and institutional 
development, and environment characterized by different levels of uncertainty.   
The remaining chapters form two sections and a summary. In Chapter 
4, I discuss my empirical context, measurement of variables and sample of 
study. I first describe the background of foreign entry into the Chinese market, 
specifically the foreign-domestic dynamics in the Chinese TV manufacturing 
market. I go on to discuss the economic and institutional transition in China, 
and how this phenomenon would affect domestic firms’ strategic reactions. I 
then introduce my sample for this study and measurement of variables. Finally 
I build the econometric equations to test my research questions. Chapter 5 
reports the empirical results of my study and provides a discussion on related 
issues. Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize the contribution and implications of 
this research for research, managers, and policy makers, and provide avenues 






CHAPTER 2 CORE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES  
 
This chapter reviews the core concepts and studies that provide the 
theoretical foundation for this dissertation. This dissertation draws from 
literatures relating to entry and competition, the resource-based view, and 
political economics and social capital theory. The theories on market entry and 
competition are examined first. Thereafter, I draw from resource-based view 
that propose that better understanding of firm reaction to market entry can be 
achieved by examining heterogeneous firm resource, such as their social ties 
to the political institutions Finally, I review core concepts and theories related 
to political ties and make an attempt to relate it to domestic firms’ strategic 
reaction following competitive foreign entry.  
 
2.1 Market Entry and Incumbent Reaction 
 
2.1.1 Market Entry  
 
Market entry into one industry has traditionally been viewed as an 
error-correction process, occurring when excess profits are high and causing 
them to fall off subsequently (Geroski, 1995). This view implies strong 
performance dynamics in the market, in which high profits will be bid down 
by new entrants until it reaches a long-term equilibrium, depending on the 




receives limited empirical support as studies that tracked entry-induced 
changes in the market share of incumbents showed only modest effect on 
profits (Geroski, 1990; Jeong & Masson, 1991). Another stream of research 
views entry also as mechanisms to stimulate growth and development in 
markets. Researchers in this stream suggest that high rates of entry are often 
associated with high rates of innovation and increase in efficiency, as entry is 
frequently used as a way to introduce new innovations and often encourages 
incumbents to cut their slacks in operation. Formal statistical analyses 
generally showed a positive association between entry and market innovation 
and productivity growth (Acs & Audretsch, 1990; Baldwin & Geroski, 1991).  
Despite different views on the nature and effect of market entry, there 
is consensus that new entry, particularly substantial new entry, can lead to 
changes in the competitive environment in an industry. In fact, the entry of 
new firms is considered as one of the most important determinants of industry 
evolution (Thomas, 1999). In summary, entry can lead to the erosion of high 
profits and market share of incumbent firms, while at the same time introduce 
new and better products to the market, which is likely to induce more efficient 
operation processes of the incumbents. As a result, incumbents have strong 










2.1.2 Incumbent Reaction  
 
(a) Incumbent Reaction: Prior Research 
 
The economics literature has devoted much research attention to the 
topic of market entry and incumbent reaction. These studies have evolved 
from determining the barriers of entry during the 1970s following Bain (1956) 
to more recent trend of examining how incumbents react to entry. The 
questions of “how” and “when” incumbents react to new entry are therefore 
critical to the understanding of this topic.  
A summary of the “how” question from past research is that 
incumbents use not only price but also advertising and new product 
introductions as ways to deter or limit the scale of entry (Thomas, 1999). First, 
incumbents tend to lower prices post entry as a way to drive out the entrants or 
as a result of increasing market supply. Empirically, several studies have 
examined incumbent pricing responses to entry, yielding inconsistent results. 
Some find that incumbents cut prices post entry (Joskow, Werden & Johnson, 
1994; Marion, 1998) while others find no response (Thomas, 1999), or even a 
positive response (Frank & Salkever, 1997). The evidence however suggests 
that price is not frequently used by incumbents to deter entry, but that 
marketing activities are (Geroski, 1995). Cubbin and Domberger (1988), for 
instance, find an incumbent responds to new entrants using advertising-related 
strategies in 40% of their sample. Sutton (1991) also showed that incumbents 




investments raise the fixed cost of operating in the industry and help to 
promote the firms’ products and facilitate output expansion.  
Finally, new product development as entry deterrence has also been 
examined. Davis and colleagues’ (2004) model suggests that the presence of 
new entrants (in differentiated markets) creates strong incentives for 
incumbent firms to differentiate their products in ways that soften price 
competition, thus encouraging firms to innovate. In sum, these research efforts 
point out that incumbent firms can respond in various ways to market entry. 
Moreover, firms may also respond simultaneously with more than one 
competitive move (Gatignon & Hanssens, 1987; Thomas, 1999). 
Another important question is when incumbents will react to new entry. 
While theory predicts an incumbent response to entry, evidence shows that 
incumbents respond selectively (Geroski, 1995). That is, different incumbent 
firms may react in different manners under different conditions. The 
heterogeneous responses to entry may reflect varying incentives and ability to 
respond, which boils down to important issue of firm heterogeneity. Simon 
(2005), for example, documented that several firm characteristics, such as the 
incumbent’s time in the market and its product portfolio, influence the firm’s 
incentives to respond to new entrants. At this point, a strategic perspective – 
which deals directly with the firm heterogeneity issue – is thus helpful and 
complementary to the economic lens on the understanding of heterogeneous 
incumbent reactions.   
The study of interfirm competition (e.g. Bettis & Weeks, 1987; Chen 
& MacMillan, 1992; Chen, Smith & Grimm, 1992; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 




of strategy. The key argument is that firms are not independent actors in the 
market, but affect each other and react to other firms’ competitive actions 
(Smith et al., 1992). A large number of studies focus on competitive dynamics 
between incumbents as a response to Caves’ appeal for more research on 
“rivalrous moves among incumbent producers” (1984: 127), whereas 
incumbents’ strategic reactions to new entry have not received deserved 
attention despite the intrinsically strategic nature of the question. This lack of 
examination thus provides research opportunities and renders potential 
contribution in this field.  
 
(b) Incumbent Reaction: A Focus on Foreign Entry 
 
The entry of foreign firms typically represents competition from a new 
set of competitors that can radically alter the competitive environment by 
introducing diverse capabilities into an industry (Ghoshal, 1987; Kogut, 1983). 
As foreign firms possess advantages that allow them to operate across borders 
(Caves, 1971; Dunning 1981), their entry into an economy is likely to increase 
rivalry and pressures for efficiency more than the entry of domestic firms 
would. These competitive pressures have a disciplining effect on domestic 
firms, requiring them to raise operations and efficiency to “global” standards 
to remain competitive, rather than to domestic standards (Caves, 1974; Lavie 
& Fiegenbaum, 2000; Lucas, 1993). Therefore, competition from foreign 
firms can be both stronger and more disputative in effect than domestic 
competition (Bowen & Wiersema, 2005), and thus may induce stronger 




Several studies examined how domestic firms react to the competitive 
entry of MNCs. Hopkins (2003) examined a set of response strategies – such 
as organizational restructuring and new distribution methods - and the timing 
of responses of dominant US firms to the entry of Japanese challengers. His 
study shows that domestic US firms that had a slower but more concentrated 
and aggressive response lost less market share than firms that respond quickly. 
Adopting a resource-based view, Bowen and Wiersema (2005) examined how 
increased foreign competition impacts a domestic firm’s diversification 
strategy in the US market. They concluded that domestic firms tend to make 
defensive reactions towards foreign competition by diversifying less from 
their core businesses. Lavie and Fiegenbaum (2000) showed that inroads made 
by MNCs triggered domestic Israeli firms to revise their strategies, and 
encouraged them to engage in joint ventures and investing more in R&D and 
marketing capabilities. However, they also noted that competition with MNCs 
relegated the Israeli firms to less attractive niches (low value and low price).  
Few studies have examined this question in the context of developing 
countries. Although it is often assumed that firms in developing countries are 
less able to respond to foreign entry, and are subject to high risk of failure, 
anecdotal evidences show that they are able to deal with foreign competition 
(Dawar & Frost, 1999). Scholarly research is scant. Wu and Pangarkar (2005) 
employed Dawar and Frost’s framework and empirically examined the 
strategies of listed Chinese firms in various industries. They conclude that the 
entry of MNCs is not all that detrimental to the domestic players – some 





Based on the theories and findings in this research stream, it is noted 
that new entry, especially the entry of MNCs, is likely to induce incumbents’ 
strategic reaction. As a first step to understand the manner and timing that 
domestic firms respond to competitive foreign entry in a developing economy, 
I next focus on one important strategic reaction of domestic incumbents, exit.   
 
2.1.3 Firm Exit  
 
To exit the industrial segment that has experienced increased 
competition is one strategic response an incumbent can take – a firm is able to 
decide whether and when it exits a segment. Though exit is usually taken as an 
outcome of the firm, to exit an industrial segment does not necessarily mean 
“death” or failure of the firm. By exiting a segment that has experienced 
increased competition, a firm may be able to shift to other segments or 
industries in which it can compete more effectively. This increases the firm’s 
flexibility and extensibility in the market.  
Exit is defined as when a firm discontinues its operations in the 
industrial segment that experienced foreign entry, or ceases operations at the 
corporate level. Following this definition, a firm can exit an industrial segment 
through two ways: through dissolution and through acquisition. Dissolution 
and acquisition represent distinctly different organizational outcomes in terms 
of organizational capabilities (Mitchell, 1994; Mitchell & Singh, 1993). 
Dissolution exit refers to a firm that ceases to operate at the business or 
corporate level without merging with another firm, including voluntary 




sold off, at the business or corporate level, to another firm. Dissolution is 
likely to destroy routines and capabilities of the firm, whereas when a business 
is sold, capabilities are transferred to a new owner and continue to be part of 
the commercial practice (Mitchell, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Freeman, 
Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
The exit of a business from a product market, whether the business is 
dissolved or is sold to another company, is an important event because of its 
effect on the evolution of the market (Mitchell, 1994). Exit has been 
extensively studied by sociologists and various influencing factors are 
identified. Age and size are important internal factors that are likely to 
influence firms’ likelihood of exit. Stinchcombe (1965) proposed that new 
organizations are more likely to fail because they depend on transactions with 
strangers, have lower legitimacy, and cannot compete as effectively as 
established peers. However, this “liability of newness” receives limited 
support by following studies. For instance, Delacroix and Swaminathan (1991) 
found that older wineries were less likely to shut down, and Carroll and 
Swaminathan (1992) found insignificant negative age influences on the exit 
rate of mass brewers and microbreweries. Meanwhile, studies on size and 
dissolution generally found that exit rate declines with greater size (Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Evans, 1987; Delacroix & Swaminathan, 
1991).  
Firms’ likelihood of exit is also likely to be influenced by external 
factors, one of which is competition. Competition occupies a central role in 
firm survival: the differential ability of firms to obtain scarce environmental 




which firms will survive (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). From an ecological 
perspective, increase in number of organizations increases the likelihood and 
intensity of competition between organizations and among population of firms, 
which may in turn increase firms’ likelihood of exit (Hannan & Freeman, 
1989). Increased competitive intensity in an industry caused by new entry can 
lead to the erosion of profits (Geroski, 1995), and is likely to threaten an 
incumbent’s position in the market as well as its access to the finite set of 
resources, which may in turn affect its likelihood of survival (Scherer, 1980; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1989). An incumbent may choose to exit the attacked 
segment as it perceives the environment as highly competitive, which could 
lead to the conclusion that trying to survive is more costly than to completely 
disengage from the competition.  
New entrants normally introduce new capabilities that differ 
substantially from existing capabilities of product market incumbents 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Entry of multinational firms 
represents a form of experiment by which new capabilities are introduced into 
the host country market by adapting routines from other contexts. The entry of 
MNCs thus tends to induce a major change in the competitive environment to 
the host market, which altered the industrial and competitive structure by 
creating additional competition for resources and markets. Caves (1996) 
contended that the proprietary assets of MNCs and their cost or productivity 
advantages over the domestic firms can drive the latter out of the market, 
increasing the likelihood that domestic incumbents are likely to exit following 





2.1.4 A Summary 
 
The review of the literatures on market entry and firm exit leads to the 
following conclusions. First, new entry, especially entry of MNCs, is an 
important phenomenon that changes the competitive environment of the 
industry and is likely to induce strategic responses from incumbents. Second, 
to understand how and when incumbents react to new entry requires the 
complementary strategic perspective, which places competition as a central 
issue yet deals little with incumbents’ strategic reaction to competitive entry. 
Third, a firm’s resources are associated with its incentives and ability to adopt 
strategic reactions. More recent studies on resources and competitive response 
suggest that a firm’s resources allow the firm to adapt to “unanticipated and 
uncontrollable changes” (such as the entry of foreign competitors) and search 
for new “profit-making or threat reducing opportunities” which can be 
redeployed to combat new competitive threat (Venkataraman, Chen & 
MacMillan, 1997). A summary conclusion from this stream of research is that 
a firm’s resources are related to the firm’s ability and incentives to take 
actions in response to the changed competitive environment.  
 
2.2 Resource-based View (RBV) 
 
In this section, I draw from resource-based view of strategy and detail 
why political ties are a value-generating resource and how it can affect firm 





2.2.1 RBV: The core of the theory 
The resource-based view (RBV) is central to strategy field in 
answering the fundamental question why firms differ in their conduct and 
profitability (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt 1984, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984). In essence, this theoretical perspective views firms as bundles of 
heterogeneous resources comprising tangible and intangible assets (Penrose, 
1959). The source of enduring sustainable competitive advantage then lies in 
those resource bundles that are both valuable in the marketplace and specific 
to the firm – which is inimitable, and not readily substitutable (Barney, 1986, 
1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1984). These 
heterogeneous and valuable resources provide different firm-specific 
capabilities through organizational processes (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993) 
which in turn influence firm strategy. Therefore, the key dimension of firm’s 
competitive strategy is, making choices about building and leveraging the 
firm’s strategic resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Penrose, 1959).  
The search for competitive advantage has focused primarily on such 
resources inside the firm (Barney, 1996), however, “critical resources may 
span firm boundaries”, and may be embedded in a firm’s boundary-spanning 
relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 661). Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer also 
acknowledged that “the search for the source of value-creating resources and 
capabilities should extend beyond the boundaries of the firm”, as this 
“presents a novel perspective for the RBV and answers an important question 
emanating from the literature as to the origin of value-generating resources” 




In fact, a firm’s linkages with external institutions can be thought of as 
creating inimitable and non-substitutable value as a resource by itself and as a 
means to access inimitable external resources (Gulati et al., 2000). 
Specifically, by virtue of firms’ external linkages being idiosyncratic and 
created through a path dependent process (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; 
McEvily & Zaheer, 1999), they are difficult for competitors to imitate or 
substitute. Moreover, a firm’s external ties allows it to access other key 
resources from its environment, such as information, capital, goods, services 
and so on that have the potential to maintain or enhance a firm’s competitive 
advantage. Since these resources being accessed are themselves idiosyncratic, 
generated through the combination of unique networks the firm possesses, 
they too are relatively inimitable and non-substitutable. Thus together, the 
firm’s external ties, and the resources they allow the firm to tap into, can serve 
as a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Gulati (1999) refers to these 
as “network resources”. Thus, from the perspective of the RBV, an important 
source for the creation of inimitable value-generating resources lies in a firm’s 
network of relationships. My dissertation, by focusing on one particular type 
of boundary-spanning firm resources – firms’ political ties, addresses an 
important gap in our understanding of the determinants of firm exit following 
competitive foreign entry. In the following section, I will discuss theories and 












The research of social networks takes into consideration that economic 
relations are embedded within larger social, political and legal context 
(Granovetter 1973, 1985) and deals with the significance of relationships as a 
resource for social action (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1990; 
Jacobs, 1965; Loury, 1987). Deeply rooted in sociology, this stream of 
research first appeared in Jacobs’ (1965) community studies, which proposed 
that networks of strong, crosscutting personal relationships that developed 
over time are of paramount importance in providing basis of trust, cooperation 
and collective action, and is critical for the survival and functioning of a 
community. Following research works applied this concept in studies on the 
development of human capital (Coleman, 1988; Loury, 1977), geographic 
regions (Putnam, 1993, 1995) and nations (Fukuyama, 1995).   
The application of social network theory is also gaining importance in 
organization studies. In general, social ties are taken as another dimension to 
help explain the differential success of firms in their competitive rivalry: the 
actions of economic actors can be greatly facilitated by their ties with other 
social actors (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The social structure underlying the 
concept of social capital is rooted in social relations in which social exchange 
such as favors and gifts are exchanged, which is different from market 
relations in which economic exchanges such as goods and services are 




studies by Baker (1990), Bourdieu (1985), Lin (2001), Adler and Kwon (2002), 
and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social ties are the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources that an actor derives from specific social structures and can 
be mobilized in the actor’s purposive actions.  
One distinct social tie is between organizations and the political system. 
Recent cross-country studies (Faccio, 2006) show that political connectedness 
is a widespread and important phenomenon across economies. In her 
pioneering paper, Anne Krueger (1974) addressed the business-government 
interface, and pointed out that entrepreneurs obtain access to business license 
by spending resources on politicians such as hiring the politician upon 
retirement. Following studies on political connections have defined political 
ties in various ways. For example, a firm can be connected to the political 
institutions by the personal political experience of the top management team 
or directors (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & 
Thesmar, 2004; Chung et al., 2008; Hillman et al., 1999), by family and social 
relationships with top politicians (Chung et al., 2008; Fisman, 2001; Gomez & 
Jomo, 1997; Johnson & Mitton, 2003), or coalition between entrepreneurs and 
political leaders (Choi & Zhou, 2001).  
Drawing on Faccio (2006) and Chung et al. (2008), I define a firm’s 
formal political ties as its formal affiliation with a country’s political system 
or/and positional overlaps between firm executives and the country’s 
politicians. By political system, I refer to the set of political agencies, which 
normally consists of the government, the parliament or its equivalent 
legislative and representative bodies, and political parties. Following this 




(1) the firm is affiliated to the political system at the organizational level, or (2) 
the firm’s owners or members of its leadership are members of legislatures, 
hold leadership positions such as minister or mayor in government, or are 
member of the administrative structure of the ruling party. The formal ties are 
different from informal ties, which are characterized by complex social 
relationships such as friendship and family ties.  Formal ties are close yet 
different from guanxi, which refers to “a web of connections to secure favors 
in personal and organizational relations” (Park & Luo, 2001:455).  
The key attribute of a formal political tie is the existence of a 
relationship that provides the firm with access to a political institution that 
provides the firm with actual or potential privileged access to a resource that it 
would not otherwise have. The resource access benefits of political ties will be 
detailed in the following section.  
 
2.3.2 Effects of political ties 
 
Political ties are a form of social ties that provide the focal actor with 
information and influence benefits. Social ties facilitate firms’ access to 
broader sources of information and improving information’s quality, relevance 
and timeliness (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social relations can serve as a vehicle 
for accessing and disseminating information (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). It is 
often less costly and more efficient than more formal mechanisms. One such 
example is that tacit information is shared efficiently through informal 
networks (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal 1998). Studies on inter-




facilitate information sharing and knowledge acquisition (e.g. Ahuja, 1996; 
Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994).  
Next, social ties also provide influence and power. Such influence and 
power enable the focal actors to get things done and achieve their goals 
(Coleman, 1988). Burt (1992, 1997) discussed the power benefit of external 
ties by studying the network locations of entrepreneurs, and argued that 
entrepreneurs spanning structural holes are more powerful as they control 
projects connecting different groups. As a special social tie, political ties also 
confer valuable reputation and status which brings social legitimacy and 
power to the connected firm. As Wank (2002: 106) describes, “spreading 
knowledge of these ties and links among the populace through gossip and 
publicity could enhance perceptions of the entrepreneur’s connections to 
officialdom, eliciting responses of deference and awe in interactions”. An 
improved reputation through network ties to political actors can in turn lead to 
privileged access to outside finance and technology. 
Political connectedness may also provide firms with benefits other than 
information and influence provided by social ties in general. Politically 
connected firms have greater access to resources social political effectiveness. 
First, connections between a firm and the state not only act as information 
conduit, but also provide critical material resources and opportunities (e.g. 
government contracts, subsidies, and loans from government-owned banks) 
that government controls (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, 1994; Backman, 1999; 
Dinç, 2002). Second, politically firms benefit from preferential treatment by 
government policy such as lighter taxation (De Soto, 1989) and reduced 




1989; Leff, 1964). Faccio’s (2006) cross-country studies found that politically 
connected firms differ sharply from those not connected: on average, leverage 
is higher in connected firms, and these firms also enjoy lower taxation, and 
they display much greater market power.  
Political ties are not established without costs. First, some political ties 
may require considerable investment in cultivating the relationship, and all 
may require some form of investment to maintain the relationship. As with 
any type of expensive investment, investment in political ties may not be cost 
efficient in certain conditions. There are considerable investments in 
information sharing, gift giving, and provision of privileges, and the other 
concrete mechanisms through which ties are established and maintained. Bian 
(2001) reports the common practice of giving banquets in China in return of 
favors. In some cases, firms may even sacrifice considerable economic gains 
to maintain their political ties, with the expectations of greater future returns. 
Second, there may also be greater opportunity costs in relying on political 
connections compared with using market mechanisms, especially when formal 
markets have already emerged (Uzzi, 1996). Heavy reliance on social 
networks has been criticized as to reduce the flow of new ideas into the group, 
and result in parochialism and inertia (Gargiulo & Bernassi, 1999). As Powell 
and Smith-Doerr (1994: 393) put it, “the ties that bind may also turn into the 
ties that blind”. Costs of connections may be so great as to offset benefits 
(Faccio, 2006). Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000), for example, find no 






2.3.3 Political Ties as a Resource 
 
Linkages to political institutions are one type of social ties. Identifying 
firms’ political ties as a firm resource will enrich the framework of RBV by 
introducing the social and political relationships as origins of competitive 
advantages. Strategy studies and RBV studies generally assume that the 
resources that form distinctive competences of firms are essentially economic 
and organizational in nature but not political (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). 
When evaluated, political factors very often appear to be viewed as constraints 
(e.g., Conner, 1991: 134). In other words, the means acquired and used to gain 
rents, as the aim of strategic behavior, are purely "intraeconomic" (Etzioni, 
1988: 218-219). Therefore, incorporating political ties as a firm resource 
expands and enriches the resource-based view of strategy by “adding a 
political component that is largely missing in that literature, which ignores 
political resources and competitive methods” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 
135).  
Political ties fit right into the criteria of resources, namely, valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. Political ties are either endowed (e.g. 
ownership ties) or created through idiosyncratic, path-dependent process (e.g. 
friendship ties). Besides, how political ties are cultivated and take effect are 
often more covert in nature, whether legal or not (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). 
Therefore, barriers to imitation (Reed & DeFillipi, 1990) may be higher for 
political resources due to the lower visibility (Etzioni, 1988: 220). Through its 
ties with political institutions, a firm is able to access critical resources from 




likely to be idiosyncratic, generated through the combination of unique ties of 
the firms, and are therefore also relatively inimitable and non-substitutable. In 
sum, the firm’s actual political ties, together with the potential resources that 
its ties allow the firm to tap into, are a valuable resource and can serve as a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
2.3.4 Political ties and firm strategy 
 
As resources form the basis and motive for competitive strategy 
(Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984) and play 
pivotal roles in firms’ competitive strategy, firm strategies are designed to 
make the most effective use of these resources (Grant, 1991). Similar to other 
resources, political ties as a resource do not constitute an end in itself for 
organizations, but rather it is a means for firms to achieve strategic objectives 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994).  
While the importance of political ties are recognized, studies directly 
examining how a firm’s strategy is influenced by its political ties are scant 
(Chung, Mahmood & Mitchell, 2008; Siegel, 2007; Peng, Lee & Wang, 2004; 
Qian, 2004). It has been shown that politically connected keiretsu managers 
have been able to fight off reforms in response to pressures from the U.S. 
government to open up Japanese market (Gerlach, 1992; Fligstein, 1996). 
Setting his study in an emerging economy, Korea, Siegel (2007) showed that 
political connectedness is one of the most significant determinants of firms’ 
international alliance formation, and the positive effect held even after the 




that warrants repeated market entry and contributes to the emergence of 
conglomerates in emerging economies (Peng, et al., 2004). Empirically, 
Qian’s (2004) study on listed Chinese firms showed that social and political 
capital exerts substantial and complex influence on firms’ diversification 
strategies. Chung, Mahmood and Mitchell (2008) reported that Taiwan 
business groups’ political ties have been an important driver of group 
diversification both before and after liberalization.  
 
2.4 Conclusions of Literature Review 
 
2.4.1 Political ties: A summary 
 
The above review permits the following conclusions. First, political 
ties are a potentially valuable resource, and may provide access to other 
resources for the firm. Second, connections with political institutions provide 
benefits to the firm, such as information, physical resources and social status. 
Finally, firms’ political ties as a resource influence their strategy formulation.  
 
2.4.2 Linking political ties with incumbent reaction 
 
To conclude this chapter of literature review, I intend to link two 
distinct streams of research, incumbent reaction and political ties. The 
examination of the literature on entry and reaction shows that incumbent firms 
react to market entry in varying manners. The understanding of whether and 




examination of the role of firm resources. Therefore, focusing on firm 
resources as a determinant of incumbent reaction is logical and desirable.  
The review of RBV and theories on political connection points out that, 
political ties are a valuable resource that spans across firm boundaries and 
provide a non-economic, political dimension to explain firm strategy and 
performance. Political connection is a widespread and important phenomenon, 
especially in environment with high competitive intensity and uncertainty, 
which is, for example, characterized by industry with substantial or sudden 
entry of MNCs. The impact of political ties on firm strategy is however not 
systematically examined. The resource-based view thus provides a conceptual 
basis for relating the above two phenomena such that incumbent firms’ 
reaction to new entry can be explained by their political ties.  
Empirically, the review indicates that in spite of the widespread 
phenomenon of political connectedness, there are few studies examining how 
political ties affect firm strategy, particularly, how politically connected firms 
vis-à-vis non-connected firms react to competitive foreign entry. In the 
following chapter, I will form propositions and hypotheses to answer the 
question how domestic firms’ political ties relate to firm exit under various 






CHAPTER 3 PROPOSITIONS & HYPOTHESES  
 
In this section, I focus on domestic firms’ exit as a strategic reaction to 
foreign entry, and form propositions and hypotheses on the relationship 
between exit and firms’ political ties. First, I examine the main effect of 
political ties on firm exit. To do so, I first study why some domestic firms are 
more likely to exit the industry, and how political ties influence firms’ exit 
decisions in this process. Next, I distinguish different types of political ties 
based on the origins and destinations of ties, and evaluate their effects on firm 
exit. Specifically, I examine the effects of ties at organizational and 
managerial level, as well as ties to political agencies with various resources 
and power, on firm exit. Next, adopting a dynamic view on the effects of 
political ties, I study the timing effects of political ties: till when the effects of 
ties will start to decay and since when the effects of (different types of) ties 
will start to kick in. Finally, I explore environmental contingency factors upon 
which the values of ties and firm strategies depend. Specifically, I examine 
how the value of political ties varies across environment with varying levels of 
macro-economic development, institutional development and market 








3.1 Political Ties and Exit 
 
3.1.1 Likelihood of Exit 
 
As a form of social ties, political ties diminish a firm’s likelihood of 
failure in competition by providing resource and legitimacy buffering. First, a 
firm gains access to different resources through its engagement in various 
kinds of relationships (Gabbay & Leenders, 1999), such as financial (e.g. Uzzi 
& Gillespie, 1999), technological (e.g. Stuart, 1999), and human (e.g. 
DiMaggio, 1992) resources. For instance, government leaders may draw on 
their own fiscal budget to assist firms that run into financial distress or under 
security litigation. These resources in turn insulate the firm from 
environmental turbulence, which reduces chance of failure. In addition, ties 
provide legitimacy and status that may reduce firms’ likelihood of failure 
when facing environmental threats (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Connected 
firms also enjoy higher social legitimacy and status, and are more able to 
withstand or oppose threats from competitors. Ties with political institutions 
are thus critical for firms’ survival and success (Luo & Chen, 1997). Firms 
that are able to gain access to the political institutions may benefit from a 
reduction in uncertainty, reduced transaction costs, and increased survival 
(Hillman et al., 1999).  
Empirical studies have shown that political connectedness enhance 
firm survival (e.g. Hillman, Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999; Fisman, 2001; 
Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Peng & Luo, 2000; Roberts, 1990). For example, 




survived and even capitalized during a major financial crisis as a result of 
government-imposed controls during that period. Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnel (2006) also showed that firms that enjoy strong political 
connectedness are more likely to be bailed out by government when they 
encounter economic turbulence, thus being less likely to fail. In conclusion, to 
be connected with the state in regulation or protective legislation is important 
for firms to increase their chance of survival in competition (Fligstein, 1996).  
External ties are found to be most beneficial in environments when 
competitive intensity is high (Baum & Oliver, 1991). As competition increases, 
resources become increasingly scarce. At the same time, firms need to exploit 
environmental resources to co-opt sources of environmental uncertainty, to 
achieve competitive advantage (Child, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Better 
connected firms are more able to mobilize resources and social support, 
reducing uncertainty following the emergence of foreign competition, thus 
obtaining greater survival advantage over their unconnected peers. For 
instance, Fischer and Pollock (2004) showed that an organization’s ties can 
have long-lasting effects on a firm’s life chances at the time a transformational 
event such as IPO activities. With the entry of MNCs into the host country, 
intensive competition for suppliers, employees and customers may place the 
very survival of the less efficient domestic firms at stake (e.g. Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999; Caves, 1974, 1996). Political ties thus become helpful in 
highly competitive and hazardous environments, as they may help to protect 
domestic firms from failure. The concrete buffering effect of political ties may 
arise from a variety of factors, such as government support and regulations, 




line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that political ties provide resources 
and legitimacy buffering and enables connected firms to withstand the 
competitive pressure from foreign entrants.  
On the other hand, there are costs in building and maintaining political 
ties, including costs of offering banquets and gifts, relying on politicians rather 
than the market, and letting the government officials to intervene into business 
decision-making. For example, it is a common practice for entrepreneurs in 
China to give free shares and lavish entertainment to officials at local or 
central authorities, which may in turn drain the finances of the firm as well as 
hamper its efficient management (Tsang, 1996). The maintaining costs and 
opportunity costs in relying on political ties instead of market mechanism may 
be so great as to offset the benefits (Faccio, 2006). Specifically regarding 
organizational failure, Uzzi (1996) has shown that relying solely on external 
networks vis-à-vis arm’s-length transactions and devoting resources at a rate 
that exceeds firm’s capacity may lead to a network that is out of step with the 
environment, and which may ultimately lead to organization failure. In 
addition, a large number of ties may even involve politicians with divergent 
interests, which is likely to increase the costs of maintaining ties. Therefore, a 
firm with more ties may not be able to survive longer, and may be under 
greater risk of exit, if the costs of maintaining political ties exceed their 
contributions. 
To summarize, as a type of social ties, political ties provide resource 
and legitimacy to connected firms following substantial competitive entry. In 
parallel, the effects of political ties on firms also depend significantly on the 




may not be excessively large if they are only involved in a few numbers of ties. 
However, as the numbers of political ties increase, such costs are likely to 
increase more than proportionally, which may even involve politicians with 
divergent interests. Therefore, the impact of political ties on firm exit is likely 
to be non-monotonic. The possession of a few ties will be associated with 
advantages greater than costs, but beyond an optimal level, such ties may 
imply greater costs than benefits. This leads to the conclusion that the hazard 
of exit will first drop with the number of ties, but beyond some optimal level, 
additional political ties will be associated with a rise in hazard of exit.  
 
Hypothesis 1. A firms’ likelihood of exit following substantial foreign 
entry will be curvilinearly related to its possession of political ties. The 
hazard of exit will first drop with the number of ties, but beyond some 
optimal level, additional political ties will be associated with a rise in 
hazard of exit.   
 
 
The above hypothesis however assumes that the negative aspects of 
political ties are either not clear to managers, or occur due to factors beyond 
managerial control, because rational managers would calculate their gains and 
costs, and would not choose suboptimal high level of political connections. In 
real life, however, managers still try to build as many political ties as they can, 
simply because it is difficult to estimate the optimal number. Moreover, ties 
are cultivated as an option, and it is not clear how valuable they will be after 
the fact. For these reasons, a linear negative relationship between political ties 









3.1.2 Mode of Exit 
 
To further understand the mechanism through which a firm’s political 
ties affect its likelihood of exit requires better understanding of exit. A firm 
can exit a field through dissolution or acquisition. Acquisition and dissolution 
represent different types of exit, and are likely to be driven by different factors 
(Chang & Singh, 1999; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983; Mitchell & Singh, 
1993). While dissolution may be a measure of overall failure (Mitchell, 1990); 
exit by acquisition may be a sign that a firm possesses valuable resources, but 
lacks the organizational resources and capabilities to leverage them.  
Exit through acquisition can be a desirable strategic choice following 
foreign entry. Exit by being acquired makes possible the recovery of at least 
part of a firm’s costs that, otherwise, will be irrevocably sunk (e.g. Jovanovic 
& Rousseau, 2003). Exit through acquisition thus allows the firms to exit with 
lower costs, increasing their mobility and also the contestability in the market, 
thus their willingness and incentive to drop out.  
Politically connected firms are more likely to exit through acquisition 
in response to foreign competition. Serving as an information conduit, political 
ties that a firm possesses can help the firm to identify potential sell-off 
opportunities and buyers, thus facilitating efficient transactions. More 
importantly, the political resources embedded in a connected firm’s formal 
and informal ties may be valued by potential acquirers who are seeking to 
establish themselves in the industry and economy (Carney & Zhang, 2005). 
Attempts by government agencies to rescue or bolster domestic firms facing 




to firms with stronger political connections. Less positively, owners or 
managers of politically connected firms may use their ties to expropriate 
residual resources from their firm through non-market disposal of the firm 
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2000). Therefore, I expect 
that a firm with stronger political ties to be more likely to exit by acquisition 
than a firm with weaker ties after substantial foreign entry.   
 
Hypothesis 2a. A domestic firm’s likelihood of being acquired 
following substantial MNC entry is positively related to its possession 
of political ties.  
 
 
A firm without political ties is less likely to benefit from positive 
intervention, and so is less likely to withstand foreign entry or be acquired as 
part of a rescue. Hence it is more likely to exit through dissolution than firms 
with stronger political ties. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. A domestic firm’s likelihood of exit through 
dissolution following substantial MNC entry is negatively related to its 




3.2 The Impact of Different Types of Ties 
 
Focusing on formal political ties, I distinguish different types of ties 
based on their origins and destinations. The origin of ties refers to “through 
whom the firm is connected”, while the destination of ties refers to “to whom 
is the firm is connected”. Based on origins of ties, I distinguish two types of 
ties, organizational ties and managerial ties. Organizational ties refer to firms’ 




managerial ties refer to firms’ top executives’ positional overlaps in the 
political institutions. Based on destinations of ties, I study political ties linked 
to political agencies with different levels of resources and power. Due to the 
different natures of these ties, and different resources embedded in them, I 
expect them to have different effects on domestic firms’ exit.  
 
 
3.2.1 Origin of ties: Organizational ties vs. managerial ties 
 
Following my definition of political ties, firms can be connected to the 
political system through the firm-level organizational ties or/and individual-
level managerial ties. Examples of important way for a firm to be connected 
with the government are government ownership (Qian, 2004) and affiliation 
with government ministries or political parties (Miner et al. 1990). It is noted 
that the strongest connections are seen in large direct financial ownership 
positions by senior politicians and government officials (Faccio, 2006). In 
some countries, governments own stakes in publicly-traded firms and may 
have a vested interest in the firm’s survival (Faccio et al., 2006). For this 
reason, such firms may be more likely to receive preferential treatment and 
intervention from the state.  
Moreover, in countries that are experiencing market-oriented transition, 
the coexistence of non-state-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is 
common. In these transition economies, where the markets are imperfect and 
the market-supporting institutions are weak, SOEs enjoy many advantages. 
For instance, they may have access to the markets for certain inputs that are 




certain highly regulated industries such as the telecommunication industry. 
The state may also use its power to help SOEs in contract enforcement, since 
the legal system in transition economies does not function well. Empirical 
evidence also shows that state-owned firms are more likely to survive than 
their unaffiliated counterparts in transition economies (Li, Zhang & Zhou, 
2005).  
Managerial ties in this study are defined as the position overlap 
between a firm’s top executives’ with the political institutions. Among various 
social networks of a firm, management level networks are the ones that can 
exert a strong effect on strategic choices (Burt 1997; Child 1972; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Granovetter 1985; Geletkanycz & Hambrick 1997; 
Hambrick & Mason 1984; Peng & Luo 2000). Managers all over the world 
devote considerable amount of time to cultivating external ties (Mintzberg, 
1973) and maintain a “disproportionately greater contact with government 
officials” in order to co-opt sources of environmental uncertainty (Child, 1994: 
154). Conceptually, managers’ linkages with government may lead to better 
performance of the firm (Nee, 1992; Walder, 1995). Empirically, Luo and 
Chen (1997:14) reported that managerial ties have a “systematic and positive 
effect” on firm performance. Peng and Luo (2000) supported the argument by 
showing that managers’ relationships with the government have strong and 
positive effect on firm performance.  
Following my arguments in the previous section, both organizational 
and managerial ties facilitate connected domestic firms in selling off and 




believe that organizational level ties may cast stronger effects on domestic 
firms’ exit decision than managerial ties.  
First, the government has more control in firms affiliated at the 
organizational level, either through direct ownership control or indirect 
administrative control. This allows more government intervention in the firms 
with organizational linkages. For instance, the government exerts control over 
the firms through controlling its board (Fan & Wong, 2005) and through 
setting up corporate structure that facilitates direct intervention (Fan et al., 
2004). Thus for these firms the firm strategy to a large extent is influenced by 
the government’s political and economic goals. On the other hand, stronger 
control also comes with more support from the state in firms with 
organizational-level political connections. For instance, opportunities such as 
bail-out or acquisition by foreign firms are more likely to be channeled to 
firms owned by or affiliated to political agencies.  
This greater intervention and support is more evident for firms’ exit 
through acquisition in transition economies, which are in the process of 
privatization, namely selling off government ownership of SOEs to private 
investors. Different from other transactions, there are normally three parties 
involved in the transaction of SOEs, the acquirer, the SOE, and the 
government. Due to its multiple objectives in SOEs, including meeting 
government’ social and political goals such as infrastructure development and 
providing relief for fiscal and unemployment problems (Lin et al., 1998), 
government would intervene the acquisition of SOEs both through its general 
economic policy and the deal terms (Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000). 




receive government attention and intervention following competitive foreign 
entry.  
Second, political ties at the organizational level are more or less 
“endowed” resources, whereas managerial resources are more transferable and 
tradable resources, and could be purchased from political markets (Boddewyn 
& Brewer, 1994). Therefore, being a harder-to-imitate resource, 
organizational-level ties such as state ownership or government affiliation may 
have even stronger effect on firm strategy, such as firms’ exit decisions. 
Empirically, Miner et al. (1990) showed that, even if financially independent 
of party intervention, Finnish newspapers affiliated with political parties 
exhibit a lower rate of failure. In sum, considering the greater support and 
control the government provides to firms connected at the organizational level, 
organizational ties will cast a stronger effect on firms’ exit decisions. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 3a. The impact of political ties on reducing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of dissolution exit following substantial MNC entry  
will be greater for organizational ties than managerial ties. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3b. The impact of political ties on increasing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of being acquired following substantial MNC entry  




3.2.2 Destinations of Ties  
 
Sociology literature suggests that differences in destination of ties may 
be critically important. In social network research, Lin, Vaughn and Ensel 
(1981) suggest that it is not how many people you know but whom you know 




attainment. While the strategy literature recognizes the importance of social 
and political ties, scant studies have directly assessed how different power 
sources of ties may influence firm strategy and performance. The recent study 
by Chung et al. (2008), being one exception, noted that the impact of political 
connections on firms depends on the relative power of different actors in the 
political regime. 
Resources and power are not equally distributed amongst political 
institutions and actors. In Coleman’s example of the legislature, some 
legislators are more powerful and influential than others, because they have 
extra resources, have built up a set of obligations from other legislators and 
thus can get legislation passed (Coleman, 1988: S103). Destinations with more 
resources are able to provide the focal firm with greater benefits such as 
information with higher quality, greater relevance and timeliness. Since the 
value of ties comes from its actual resources and access to potential resources, 
it is natural to believe that political destinations with better resources and 
greater access to potential resources will be able to provide connected firms 
with greater survival advantages, or greater opportunities to sell off. Thus, I 
propose that 
 
Hypothesis 4a. The negative effect of domestic firms’ political ties on 
their likelihood of exit through dissolution is greater for firms with ties 
linked to destinations that have greater resources.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4b. The positive effect of domestic firms’ political ties on 
their likelihood of being acquired is greater for ties linked to 






I will explore two manifestations of political power and resources, 
namely, the levels in the political hierarchy, and the specific political power 




3.3 A Dynamic View on Effects of Political Ties 
 
3.3.1 The “Until when” Question 
 
The influence of political ties is not static. The buffering effects against 
competition of political ties on domestic firms may not be sustainable. First of 
all, political ties allow the connected firms to survive and operate with a lower 
efficiency due to easier resources access and negative intervention of political 
goals. Extra resources allow the connected firms to operate at a lower 
efficiency than other firms to withstand threats from their competitors (Miner, 
Amburgey & Sterns, 1990). The resource-buffering may take effect against 
competitive threats, whereas running at a low efficiency may eventually lead 
to failure. Besides, connected firms usually need to compromise their profit 
maximization with political goals placed on them, which may increase the 
hazard of failure in the long run. The politicians’ compensation and promotion 
are affected by their achievements in various social and political objectives. 
For instance, it is important for the politicians to improve the employment and 
fiscal conditions under his/her jurisdiction, building relationships with 




achieving these goals may not help or jeopardize firm efficiency and profit 
maximization goal.  
Further, connections to the political agencies may create a new 
vulnerability to the source of buffering, making firms subject to the whim or 
fate of the resource-supplying institutions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For 
instance, a politically connected firm may be able to obtain government 
contract thus survived competition following competitive foreign entry; in the 
long run, however, the value of ties that used to insulate the firm from external 
turbulence may disappear if the politician loses his/her power in the political 
hierarchy. Therefore, political ties that used to reduce uncertainty may have a 
diminished effect on firms, or even turn against the firm in the future and 
increase the uncertainty due to shift of political power.  
Therefore, as a resource, political ties do not have perpetual effect on 
firm exit and dissolution exit, and has its limit up to a point where the 
buffering and insulation effect may eventually disappear. So the political ties 
will allow the connected firms to survive until it is acquired, or dissolved. In 
conclusion, political ties are more likely to exert immediate effects on firm 
exit and exit through dissolution. As to the effect on long-term exit of political 
ties, I leave the question open in my empirical analysis. Accordingly, I 
propose that  
 
Hypothesis 5. The effects of political ties on firms’ likelihood of exit  










3.3.2 The “Since when” Question 
 
 
Not all ties impact firm exit simultaneously. In addition to stronger 
impact, I also expect political destinations with greater resources will have an 
earlier impact on domestic firms’ more desirable strategic choice, namely, 
being acquired. Chung et al. (2008) found that business groups in Taiwan 
connected with the KMT party diversified more extensively, whereas linkages 
to legislators and government officials have no effects on diversification. This 
study did not distinguish between earlier and later impact of different ties. I 
expect that more powerful destinations will have an earlier impact on domestic 
firms’ likelihood of being acquired because they allow for immediate access to 
information and resources, as well as political support for the acquisition deal. 
Simply put, more influential political actors can get things done faster. In 
contrast, politicians with weaker access to or less direct control over resources 
may also provide value in acquisition deals but which will take longer to 
influence the likelihood of being acquired of their favored firms. Thus, 
destinations with greater resources are likely to have an earlier impact on 
domestic firms’ likelihood of being acquired than destinations with fewer 
resources.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Ties linked to political destinations with greater  
resources will have an earlier impact on domestic firms’ likelihood of  
being acquired.  
 
 
The value and influence of political ties are not universally equal. For 
instance, prior studies have suggested that Party membership of private 




less developed market (Li, et al., forthcoming). Therefore, a more intriguing 
and important question is: when and where do ties matter more? In the 
following sections, I explore two sets of boundary conditions of the tie-exit 
relationship, namely the value of ties across economic conditions and over the 
process of market and institutional transition.  
 
3.4 Political Ties across Economic Conditions 
 
 I argue that the effect of political ties on firm strategy is likely to be 
stronger in regions with less developed macroeconomic conditions. Resources 
are limited in less developed regions, so firms need to compete harder for 
environmental resources. Firms’ external linkages are argued to be most 
beneficial under competitive conditions (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Therefore, in 
regions with limited resources to distribute and firms are competing for such 
resources, those with better linkages to the government are more likely to 
mobilize resources as well as social and political support, thus are more likely 
to have a survival advantage over their unconnected competitors. Further, the 
enhanced ability of connected firms is more likely in transition economies, 
where resources are still are greatly controlled by the state. Thus, I argue that 
ties with the government become more important in less developed regions 
compared with in regions with more resources to distribute.  
 
Hypothesis 7a. The impact of political ties on reducing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of exit following substantial MNC entry will be  








Hypothesis 7b. The impact of political ties on reducing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of dissolution exit following substantial MNC entry  
will be greater, the lower the rate of economic growth in a region. 
 
 
Hypothesis 7c. The impact of political ties on increasing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of being acquired following substantial MNC entry  




3.5 Political Ties in Institutional Transition  
 
3.5.1 Value of political ties in transition 
 
The embeddedness approach (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), 
which has demonstrated the importance of social relationships for economic 
transactions, needs to be complemented by the dynamic view of the influence 
of the “larger, historically transient, social structures” in which economic 
transactions are embedded (Lie, 1997: 351; Luo & Chung, 2005). Prior 
research on social and political ties has taken place in relatively stable 
environments (Peng & Luo, 2000). Transition from centrally planned 
economies to market economies – such as the ongoing processes in some 
major and emerging economies of Asia and Eastern Europe – offers 
opportunities to explore how changing market-supporting institutions alter the 
effects of political ties on domestic firms’ strategic reactions over time. The 
evolving institutional environment, such as the increasing legal effectiveness, 
the shift of political power, implementation of new law and regulations, and 
privatization of incumbent firms, shape the efficacy of political ties by 
affecting the benefits and costs of such ties (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Peng, 




boundaries, tends to vary with changing external environment during market 
transition. For example, Chung et al. (2008) show that different types of 
political ties have different effects on firm diversification strategy over time as 
political regimes evolved in Taiwan. 
 
a. Increasing or reducing value of political ties? 
 
There are two perspectives on the value of political ties in institutional 
transition. One argues that the value of political ties will gradually disappear 
in transition. Connections are viewed as substitutes for formal institutional and 
structural support (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Political ties are thus particularly 
beneficial in environment with under-developed institutional environments. 
Characteristics of under-developed institutional environment include 
unreliable property rights protection, inefficient and corrupt governments, 
inefficient judicial systems, and weak enforcement of laws and contracts 
which add to the weak institutional infrastructure in these economies (Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997; Kock & Guillen, 2001). In these economies, institutional 
underdevelopment leads to a great deal of information asymmetry between 
economic actors, which in turn leads to high uncertainty and turbulence in the 
environment. As Hoskisson et al. (2000) suggested, competitive advantage is 
difficult to establish without good relationships with the government in 
environment of weak institutions. Following this line of reasoning, the value 
of political ties will decrease when market institutions get stronger. Scholars 




better laws and regulations, firms’ use of political connections will be 
increasingly dangerous as law enforcement is strengthened.  
The other view holds that despite the movement to a more efficient 
market-economy, the need for political ties may be even greater during the 
time when an economy undergoes market-oriented transition. The market 
institutional transition is likely to introduce, at least in the short run, 
considerable chaos and uncertainties as new institutions emerge to replace old 
ones (Oliver, 1992). This process creates uncertainties for firms as to the exact 
direction and speed of reform (Child & Tse, 2001). Such policy uncertainties 
during transition, in turn, create further need for connections to the political 
circle for information and support (Park & Luo, 2001). As a result, given the 
rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning functions of the state, particularly 
frequent arbitrary intervention from the government in transition economies 
(Nee, 1992; Peng, 1997), linkages with state and regulatory institutions can 
help firms navigate uncertain environments.  
In addition to policy uncertainties during transition, intensified 
competition for resources and markets may increase the value of political ties. 
When an economy undergoes economic transition, previously government-
controlled resources may become available in the market, and barriers to 
restricted markets may be lowered, attracting market entry and greater 
competition. When entry barriers decline but state actors retain many levers 
for steering these resources in the directions that they prefer, it may be 
profitable for firms to rely on political ties for resource acquisition (White 
2002; Westney 2001; Fligstein 2001; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Keister, 1998; 




be even greater than in the pre-marketization period, and research suggests 
that network or political ties can be even more valuable after economies 
undergo democratization and deregulation (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998, 
Siegel, 2004). Rettberg (2001), for instance, showed that after the large wave 
of privatization in Colombia in the early 1990s, political ties to the 
government were critical for business groups to access contracts, licenses and 
credit. Choi and Zhou’s (2001) findings also support their idea that the effects 
of entrepreneurs’ prior political experience on economic gains actually 
increase as markets develop.  
 
b. A way towards reconcilement 
 
My interpretation is that arguments and findings from these two 
seemingly conflicting perspectives are not contradictory. In short, while better 
market-supporting institutions may decrease the value of political ties, policy 
and market uncertainties during the transition process can enhance the value of 
these ties. Peng (2003) demonstrates the changing benefits and costs of 
external social relationships as opposed to market-based exchanges, 
suggesting that the benefits of using social relationships will first increase then 
decrease, whereas the costs will decrease and then increase during market 
transition. We can see that for a relatively long period during transition, there 
are multiple periods in which benefits outweigh costs, as well as the other way 
around, suggesting a changing sign of net benefit more than once. This means 
that, empirically, we may or may not be able to detect significant difference in 




time. However, if, instead, we measure specific aspects of the institutional 
transition, we are likely to find the varying effect of political ties over these 
changes.  
Essentially, I propose that political ties remain an important influence 
on firms’ exit strategies following substantial foreign entry, but expect that the 
strength of effects of these ties to vary along changes in transition, with the 
exact nature of the variation depending on contextual factors and firms’ 
strategies which again depends on the external environment. Therefore, I 
separate two important aspects of institutional transition, the development of 
market-supporting institutions (e.g. market development and legal 
effectiveness) and uncertainties originated from transition, and examine how 
these contextual factors impact the effects of political ties on firm exit.  
 
3.5.2 Institutional development and political ties  
 
Legal effectiveness. I first examine how a gradually improving and 
established codified legal system will influence the value of political ties. 
Personal connections are particularly important in environment without a 
strong legal and regulatory environment that allows for impersonal 
transactions (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Firms are unlikely to deal with parties that 
they do not trust without an effective judiciary system. Therefore, they resort 
to personal connections in environment with weak legal system. When laws 
and regulations get better, the net benefits associated with relying on informal 
ties will decrease relative to the benefits of relying on formal legal system. 




political ties. When an impartial judiciary is in place, firms are more likely to 
go to courts, whereas in environment with low legal effectiveness, ties linked 
to the political agencies become an important mechanism that substitute for 
the norms and processes associated with formal legal system. Therefore in 
environment with higher legal effectiveness, the value of political ties will be 
lower, and thus the weaker effects of political ties on domestic firms’ exit 
decisions following foreign entry.  
Market development. An important feature of market transition is the 
installation and improvement of market-supporting institutions. In 
environment with poor market development, even if there are substantial costs 
involved, firms choose to rely on their connections for transactions (Keister, 
2001). As market system expands and market barriers decrease, firms can 
resort to formal markets more intensively, which can be more reliable and less 
costly than using social relationships to obtain resources and thus can 
economize both opportunity costs and investment costs for cultivating and 
maintaining political ties (Zhou, 2004). Following these arguments, the gains 
from using political ties in doing businesses will decrease while the gains from 
using formal markets will increase as the market develops. In sum, market 
development decreases the value of political ties (Guthrie, 1999; Keister, 
2001). Li et al.’s (forthcoming) study, for instance, has shown that Party 
membership in China helps executives to achieve better firm performance in 
environments with weaker legal protection and weaker market development. 







Hypothesis 8a. The impact of political ties on reducing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of dissolution (or increasing domestic firms  
likelihood of being acquired) following substantial MNC entry  
will be greater, the weaker the legal effectiveness. 
 
 
Hypothesis 8b. The impact of political ties on reducing domestic  
firms’ likelihood of dissolution (or increasing domestic firms  
likelihood of being acquired) following substantial MNC entry  




3.5.3 Market Uncertainty and Political Ties 
 
Uncertainty is the inability to forecast or predict (Anderson & 
Tushman, 2001). External environment can be the source of uncertainty for 
firms (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Scott, 1992). Economies undergoing market and 
institutional transition provide an ideal empirical setting to allow for 
substantial economic and policy uncertainties, as the transition process creates 
uncertainties for firms as to the exact direction and speed of reform (Child & 
Tse, 2001). Research has suggested that uncertain environments are most 
hazardous for firm survival (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Podolny & Stuart, 
1995) for two reasons. First, firms are more likely to fail when they make 
changes to adapt to the unpredictable environment (Rosenbloom & 
Christensen, 1994). Next, firms facing unpredictable environment are more 
likely to encounter internal political turbulence (Anderson & Tushman, 2001), 
which will reduce firms’ ability to deal with environmental turbulence.  
On the other hand, the real option theory suggests otherwise: the higher 
the environmental uncertainty and volatility, the greater the value of 
continuing status quo vis-à-vis exit (Dixit, 1989). When a firm enters an 




future profits before taking a step (such as exit) that might prove difficult to 
reverse (Bernanke, 1983). Regardless of whether demand rises or falls, the 
firm can tailor an appropriate strategy, provided it keeps the option open. The 
more volatile the opportunity, the less it risks losing by holding the option. 
Conversely, as volatility decreases, the firm may gain more by striking 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Therefore, during times of high uncertainty, when 
the market is hard to predict, firms have more incentives to wait and “keep 
their options open” than in the more stable environment, reducing potential 
losses as much as possible. Following this perspective, firms are less likely to 
exit in uncertain environment.  
While the impact of uncertainty on firm exit may be ambiguous, the 
influence of uncertainty on the value of political ties is relatively direct. Since 
market uncertainty implies an absence of information regarding industry 
structure and change (Duncan, 1972), uncertainties during transition create 
greater need for connections to the political circle for information and support 
(Park & Luo, 2001). Being an information conduit, by providing information 
to connected firms which is not readily available publicly, political ties are a 
source of competitive advantage (Mizruchi, 1997) that will allow connected 
firms to stay longer in competition or find suitable acquirers. Operating in 
uncertain, turbulent environment, firms tend to rely more heavily on their 
external ties for strategic decision, as these ties act as informational conduits 
“that shapes managerial views of the environment and contributes to the set of 
alternatives from which strategic choices are made” (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997: 655). Connections to the state may also provide indirect linkages to 




and reliable suppliers and more loyal customers. Therefore, the strength of tie 
impact will be enhanced by the increasing level of environmental uncertainty. 
Research on China finds that political ties provide firms with more 
institutional support to mitigate challenges arising from market uncertainty 
(Luo, 2003; Peng & Luo, 2000; Xin & Pearce, 1996). Thus, I propose that 
 
Hypothesis 9. The greater the market uncertainty, the greater the  
effects of political ties on domestic firms’ likelihood of dissolution or  




In conclusion, the propositions and hypotheses detailed above in this 
section summarize the critical aspects of the effect of political ties on how 
domestic firms react to the competitive entry of MNCs. The various sets of 
hypotheses relate domestic firms’ exit decisions to their possession of political 
ties. Collectively, these hypotheses suggest that external ties with political 
institutions are relevant in understanding the exit decisions of domestic firms 
following substantial foreign entry, and in a transition economy (see Figure 
3.1 for an overview). 
 








CHAPTER 4 METHODS AND MEASURES 
 
 
This chapter describes the empirical context of the study, the Chinese 
TV manufacturing industry. I elaborate the competitive dynamics of foreign 
and domestic firms in this industry and introduce the political ties in the China 
context. Next, I discuss the key methodological issues of variable definition 
and operationalization, model specification, and statistical estimation. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reviews general FDI 
trend in China, the entry of MNCs into the Chinese TV industry, as well as the 
issue of the political connectedness in China. The second section describes all 
variables, explains the procedures used to collect data, and details the sources 
from which data are obtained. The third section presents formal models which 
will be used to test my hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Context and Sample 
 
The empirical setting of this study is the Chinese TV manufacturing 
industry during the period 1993-2003. China is a suitable context for this study. 
China is a developing economy with somewhat developed local industries in 
some areas since the opening up of the economy. There is rapid rise of FDI 
and competition between domestic and foreign players in China, especially in 
recent times, providing good macro context for the test of my research 




The Chinese TV manufacturing industry is an appropriate context to 
examine my research question as it was not only the world’s largest TV 
manufacturing industry during the period of study, but was a largely domestic 
industry prior to 1993 before the sudden entry of foreign TV manufacturers. 
The Chinese TV industry received substantial foreign investment during a 
period of rapid transition over the period of my study, leading to sufficient 
domestic-foreign competitive dynamics. The entry of foreign firms in this 
industry also took place after the domestic industry had grown and developed 
to the point of approaching international standards of design, technological 
and operating efficiencies. This allows a focus on the competitive aspects of 
the interaction between foreign and domestic firms. The relatively late entry of 
foreign firms also permits comprehensive analysis without the “left censoring” 
problem.  
In the following sections, I will detail various aspects of my context, 
including FDI in China, the Chinese TV industry, political ties and political 
institutions in China, and characteristics of China’s transition.  
 
4.1.1 FDI in China  
 
China has experienced rapid growth in FDI inflow and has become the 
largest recipient of FDI amongst the developing countries. Along with China’s 
entry into World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s economy is becoming 
increasingly open to foreign investors. Against the background of a transition 
enterprise sector, this growing openness is raising concerns over the ability of 




& Jefferson, 2002). In this section, I will briefly describe the trend and 
distribution of FDI in China.  
Foreign direct investment started modestly in China after the passage 
of the 1979 Law on Joint Ventures. Along with the gradual improvement of 
the investment environment, China experienced a steady increase in FDI 
inflow during the 1980s, from a few hundred million dollars annually during 
the late 1970s to almost US$3.5 billion annually in the late 1980s. Despite a 
delay of many FDI projects after the 1989-Tiananmen Square Event, China 
has again started attracting an increasing amount of FDI since 1991. The year 
of 1992 is a symbolic year in the transition history of China. Foreign 
investments started to pour into the China market soon after Deng Xiaoping’s 
tour to the Southern China (nanxun) during the early 1992. The year 1992 saw 
a jump of about 152 percent in FDI compared with previous year, followed by 
an almost 150 percent increase for 1993. This impressive, sudden increase of 
FDI inflows is outlined in Figure 4.1. The trend continues in the following 
years despite a slight drop during the late 1990s. The FDI inflow continues to 
rise steadily after 2000. By the end of 2005, China has become world's third 
largest FDI recipient, according to the World Investment Report (2006).  
 
*** Table 4.1 about here *** 
 







4.1.2 The Chinese TV manufacturing industry 
 
The first TV set in China was produced in 1958, but it was not until the 
1970s that the TV manufacturing sector started to emerge with heavy planning 
by the Chinese government. The first group of entrants into the TV industry 
was driven by government’s intention to utilize the excess capacity of 
electronic industry caused by “Warfare for electronics (dianzi dahuizhan)” 
commanded by the then-vice-chairman, Lin Biao. Then during the late 1970s, 
another group of entrants, which used to produce military electronic goods and 
were under the direct control of Ministry of Electronics Industry, began to 
enter the TV market. The market structure has since then been very dispersed 
during the partial reform era, and the central government made several 
attempts to consolidate the market, such as appointing “qualified” TV makers 
(dingdian qiye) and component suppliers, adopting rationing system for TV 
distribution and setting quota for TV production.  
It was also during this period that Hitachi made the first foreign entry 
(in 1981) into the Chinese TV industry by setting up a joint venture, Fujian 
Hitachi Television Co. Ltd. Unfortunately, the venture was unable to fully 
exploit the domestic market as the Chinese government restricted its sales to 
200,000 units per year and demanded the company to maintain a “foreign 
exchange balance” which resulting in “Fujian Hitachi” competing against 
other Hitachi brands on the market of East Asia (Marukawa, 2002). The 
government’s plan to reorganize the industrial organization was eventually 
frustrated by the rampant entry of new firms. Finally, in 1993, all government 
controls over the quantity and price of TVs were abolished. As a result, major 




in the Chinese TV market and tremendous changes have since taken place in 
this industry. Table 4.2 demonstrates the major events of the Chinese TV 
industry before the market was opened. Figure 4.2 presents the number of 
firms and industrial sales in the Chinese TV industry over the period of 1993-
2004.  
 
*** Table 4.2 about here *** 
 
*** Figure 4.2 about here *** 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the trend of imports and sales of foreign TV 
manufacturers in the Chinese market. It is evident that sales made by MNCs in 
Chinese TV industry was almost non-existent before 1993, and only started to 
pick up after 1993. The year 1998 was a turning point in the industry, as sales 
of foreign firms started to decline, leading them to shift to higher-end markets 
focusing on plasma, LCD and projection televisions (Wang et al., 2005). 
Therefore, the competition in this industry can naturally be divided by 1998 
into two competitive stages based on the focus on competition. Figure 4.4 
describes the industrial structure of the TV manufacturing industry by showing 
the proportion of manufacturers by ownership year to year from 1993 to 2005.  
 
*** Figure 4.3 about here *** 





Most of the multinationals entered the Chinese market by setting up 
joint ventures with domestic manufacturers. Two leading European producers 
invested in the early 1990s. Thomson from France relocated its manufacturing 
for export from Taiwan to Shenzhen in 1991. In 1992, Philips of the 
Netherlands, which already had an extensive network of Chinese affiliates, 
took a 51% stake in the Suzhou TV Set Factory to produce medium-size sets 
with annual capacity of 800,000 and joined the top ten selling brands in 1996. 
More MNCs arrived after 1993, when the government eased the rules on 
domestic sales by foreign-funded ventures. Japanese television producers have 
invested in China’s television sector gradually. Matsushita, one of the world’s 
largest producers, entered in 1995 through a 50% joint venture to produce 21- 
to 29-inch sets with a local producer, Shandong Dong Chen Industrial. This 
has been followed by three 70% foreign-controlled joint ventures: Sony with 
Shanghai Video & Audio, primarily for export; Sharp with Nanjing Panda, 
and Toshiba with Dalian Daxian Group for 21-29-inch sets. The leading 
Korean television producers were also relatively late investors in China’s 
television industry. In 1994, Samsung Electronics formed a 50%-owned joint 
venture in Tianjin with the same partner it had joined a year earlier for a VCR 
plant. LG Electronics has made several investments in China since 1994, but 
its investment in televisions, a 70%-owned venture in Shenyang in 1996, was 
at a relatively modest initial scale of 200,000 units (White and Linden, 2002). 
Table 4.3 lists the time and mode of entry of all major foreign TV 
manufactures that entered the Chinese TV industry.  
 





4.1.3 Political ties in China  
 
Political connectedness is a widespread phenomenon all over the world 
(Faccio, 2006), but in a market-oriented transition economy such as China, the 
ties and coalition between the government and entrepreneurs cover a greater 
area since the state was in control of most resources (Choi & Zhou, 2001). 
Political ties are viewed as one element in the concept of “guanxi”, and are 
seen as a potential substitute for the lack of institutional infrastructure in China 
(Xin & Pearce, 1996). For example, given the weak institutional arrangements 
in China, connections to the government is argued to be an effective way for 
firms to gain resources and influence to support new initiatives (Peng & 
Health, 1996; Xin & Pearce, 1996). Evidence has shown that, to access the 
resources in government’s hand, Chinese managers have maintained a 
“disproportionately greater contact” with government officials (Child, 
1994:154; Luo & Chen, 1997; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Some scholars have argued for a declining economic importance of 
political ties in China (Guthrie, 1998). However, at least two phenomena in 
China challenge this view. First, despite more than two decades of reform and 
increasingly improved institutional framework, officials at various levels of 
the political institution still have tremendous power over resource allocation 
and project approval (Walder, 1995). In addition, politicians in China have 
maintained heavy, and arbitrary, intervention into business activities (Nee, 
1992; Peng, 1997). Therefore, it becomes critical for firms in China to 
maintain good ties with the political agencies to stay competitive. On the other 




market transition, since private ownership gained legal recognition. This 
liberal policy has enabled government officials to negotiate deals openly with 
enterprises, and often in competition with bureaucrats from other government 
offices (Choi & Zhou, 2001).  
Recent empirical evidence has supported the argument that political 
connectedness is critical for firms’ resource acquisition and performance in 
China. For instance, Li et al. (2007) has found that affiliation with the ruling 
Communist Party in China helps private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from 
banks and other state institutions, which leads to higher performance 
ultimately. Choi and Zhou’s (2001) study also shows that prior political 
experience significantly increased entrepreneurs’ profit. In spite of the 
increasingly interest on political ties in China, to my best knowledge, there is 
no empirical study on the effect of political ties on firms’ exit decisions in the 
context of China.  
 
4.1.4 Political system in China 
 
(1) Political institutions at central vs. local levels 
 
The political hierarchy of China is a political power staircase. The 
central government is at the top of the stairs in terms of its authority. The 
central government designs macro-economic plans for the lower levels of 
government to implement; it initiates various regulations and rules to constrain 
the lower level of governments; and it plans for the resource allocation of the 




provincial level, including governments of provinces, autonomous regions and 
centrally administered municipalities. A province or an autonomous region is 
in turn subdivided into autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous 
counties and /or cities. A local government’s authority is confined to its region 
and is restricted by adherence to policies and regulations of the central 
government1. The political power staircase is ideal for testing tie destinations 
with different power and resources. I next explore what impacts central and 
local ties exert on domestic firms’ exit strategies.  
 
For the case of China, in which the state is highly centralized and 
retains significant power over economic matters, I believe that ties linked to 
the central political agencies may provide greater resources and power, and 
thus stronger effect on firms’ exit decisions as compared with ties to local 
government. First, political institutions at the national level such as central 
governments have the greatest political power and authority. Firms affiliated 
with a higher level of government enjoy greater exposure to political resources 
than a firm linked to local government. Examples of such resources are good 
reputation and greater bargaining power, if a firm is linked with central 
government. In addition, greater political power leads to greater economic 
power of the national political agencies. For instance, Walder (1995) argued 
that the industrial base of each level of government in China decreases 
dramatically, meaning that the higher the government level, the larger its 
industrial base. This further implies that linkages to higher level of 
government can be related to higher level of deployment of resources for 
                                                 




economic activity. In sum, considering the great political power and resource 
access of political institutions at the national level, I believe that ties to 
political institutions at the national level exert the strongest effect on firms’ 
exit following substantial foreign entry.  
 
 
(2) Political agencies in China 
The political system of China consists of four major bodies, 
representing four power sources2:  
 
a. The Government Agencies 
The government agencies in China include (1) the State Council and 
the government ministries and (2) provincial and lower level government. The 
State Council of China, also known as Central People’s Government, is the 
highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ of State 
administration. It is generally considered equivalent to a cabinet in Western 
political system (ECPRCY, 1999). The State Council is composed of a 
premier, vice-premiers, State councilors, ministers in charge of ministries and 
commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general. Directly under the 
State Council are government ministries (e.g. Ministry of Science and 
Technology, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information Industry), 
commissions (e.g. State Development Planning Commission), and bureaus 
(e.g. State Bureau of Taxation, National Bureau of Statistics).  
Governments at the lower level replicate many features of the central 
government in Beijing. Each province has its government, which is in turn 
                                                 





replicated at the level of city, county and lower levels within the province. 
Each province also has bureaus of central government ministries, commissions 
and offices. Cities with independent planning authority may exercise many 
functions of a province, particularly in investment and economic planning.  
 
b. The People’s Congress (PC) 
The People’s Congress is China’s legislature, which, as stipulated by 
the Chinese Constitution, is the highest organ of state power in China. 
Following the government hierarchies, there is a PC at each administrative 
level, including the central, provincial, municipal, county, and township levels. 
Local PCs have the power to elect chief officials at their own administrative 
levels, to draft and approve local laws and policies, and to impeach 
government officials when necessary. The PC at the central level, i.e. the 
National People’s Congress (NPC), is considered the highest organ of state 
power of the People’s Republic of China. Its main functions and powers 
include making laws and policies and electing top government officials in the 
central government. Theoretically, the PCs at all levels are instituted through 
elections, but the party and government officials still control the process of 
candidate nomination. Thus, it is not surprising that all major party and 
government officials are deputies of the PC at the local/central level. 
 
c. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is an advisory 
body to the party/government in China, somewhat analogous to an advisory 




the Constitution of 1954 when this function was transferred to the National 
People's Congress. The main current functions of the CPPCC are to hold 
political consultations and to exercise democratic supervision of the party and 
governments. Political consultation is held on major political, economic, 
cultural and social policies, both before decisions are made and in the process 
of their implementation. By making proposals and criticisms at regular 
meetings with the party and government officials, the CPPCC exercises its 
function of democratic supervision over the enforcement of China’s 
Constitution, laws and regulations, the implementation of major policies and 
the performance of government departments and their employees. When a 
CPPCC member makes a proposal, the government is committed to 
responding to it within a certain period. Although the party/government still 
has tight control over the CPPCC, it is more independent from the 
party/government than is the PC. CPPCC nominees on the preliminary list 
need to survive the screening process by the party to get on the final slate, but 
all social and economic organizations are allowed to nominate their own 
candidates. Because of the special mechanism for selecting CPPCC members, 
it has a much smaller party representation than the PC and its members come 
from more diversified backgrounds, many of them being members of the 
social, cultural, and business elite (Li et al., forthcoming). The PC and CPPCC, 
together, represent the country’s legislative institutions. 
 
d. The Communist Party 
A unique feature of China that sets it apart from other transition 




Party of China (CPC) is the party in power in the country. The CPC has both 
central and local organizations. At the top is the Central Committee and, while 
when it is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee 
exercise the power of the Central Committee. Both the Political Bureau and its 
Standing Committee are elected by the plenary session of the Central 
Committee. The highest leading body of the Party is the National Congress 
and the Central Committee elected by it.  
 
Considering the political structures in China, I argue that ties linked to 
the government will have a stronger effect than those linked to the legislature 
and political parties. Broadly, compared with the legislature and political party, 
the government agency has direct access to and control over resources, and is 
thus more able to provide immediate and direct support and resources to firms 
connected to it. Moreover, the government has great control over military and 
other state-owned institutions, and is able to regulate the market through tax 
policy, industrial policy, antitrust policy, and through its regulation of the 
banks, among other tools that it has at its disposal (Siegel, 2004). On the other 
hand, the influence of ties to legislature and political party is unlikely to be 
immediate and direct. Politicians in the legislative body or the political party 
may need to resort to their ties with the government, and indirectly support 
their favored firms. Faccio (2006), for instance, shows that the ties to 
government ministers generate greater value than ties to parliament members. 
In summary, I argue that ties to the government have the strongest impact on 





4.1.5 China’s transition 
 
China shares common characteristics with other transition economies – 
“committed (in varying degrees) to strengthen their market mechanism 
through liberalization, stabilization, and the encouragement of private 
enterprise” (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000). On the other hand, the 
economic transition in China has its distinct feature from other transition 
economies. It is well known that in Russia and Eastern European countries, 
privatization – which is driven by the central government – is the key focus 
and driver of economic transition. Meanwhile, “one of the most distinct 
features of China’s transition has been associated with devolution of authority 
from the central to local levels of government” (Qian & Roland, 1998: 1156). 
This is consistent with the view that “the critical component of China’s 
market-oriented reform, which began in 1979, is decentralization” (Qian & 
Weingast, 1996).  
During its economic reform, the Chinese central government gradually 
delegated authority to the lower level government units, including provincial, 
municipal and village governments. The decentralization was motivated by the 
central government’s desire of promoting market mechanism and gradually 
replacing its central planning function. Such decentralization from the central 
government provides an institutional basis for local government to support 
economic development (Oi, 1999). These local governments are now able to 
“formulate their own policies that attract investment and govern business 
operations under their jurisdiction, within a general framework set by the 




Relating to my Hypothesis Set 7, researchers on market transition 
suggests that governments in regions with less developed markets can 
influence the local economy more significantly and tend to have more 
controlling power over local companies (Qian & Weingast, 1997; Qian & 
Roland, 2000). It is important for a politician to improve the employment rate 
and the fiscal condition of the region under his jurisdiction, so local 
governments of different regions have demand for improving economic 
development using corporate resources. Therefore, in less developed regions, 
local governments have more urgent needs to make use of corporate resources 
to mitigate economic problems (Fan & Wong, 2004). Due to the greater needs 
of regional politicians to use corporate resources to promote economic growth, 
politically connected firms in less developed regions are more likely to receive 
attention and preferential treatment by the local government, thus less likely to 
dissolve following the entry of foreign competitors, and more likely to be 
acquired. I explore this relationship empirically.  
 
4.2 Data and sample 
 
I test my hypotheses on 330 Chinese TV manufacturers for the 1993-
2003 period. A list of firms in the Chinese TV manufacturing industry (close 
to the population) is obtained from Wanfang Data Company 
(www.wanfangdata.com.cn), a Beijing-based business and academic-
information provider under China’s Ministry of Science and Technology. 
Wanfang’s Chinese Enterprises and Companies Database was started in 1988. 




collected through multiple means, including mailed questionnaires, telephone 
surveys, and printed materials, and are updated annually. Research using this 
data source has appeared in academic journals (Li & Wong, 2003; Lu & Xu, 
2006).  
The database provides firm registration information (firm ID, date of 
incorporation, province, city and other characteristics), fixed assets, sales, 
different industry classification, product details and ownership type. In 
addition, the names of top management are provided by Wanfang. I use the 
names of these top executives to collect data of managerial ties.  
Other firm-level variables were obtained from a variety of sources. Data 
on exit was collected primarily from the China Electronics New (CEN), a unit 
of China’s Ministry of Information Industry, and the most influential and 
comprehensive industry newspaper on various segments of the electronics 
industry in the country. Data on political ties were collected from the 
following sources: (1) official websites of the government, the legislature and 
the political party, at central, provincial and municipal levels; (2) China VIPs 
(the 2003 edition), a directory published by China INFOBANK. China VIPs 
lists a total of 4,828 names and positions of key personnel in China, including 
leading government officials, persons of political, military, academic and 
economic importance. All information was compiled from public sources 
including newspapers, magazines and books up to March 2001; (3) Xinhua 
News Agency, the state news agency in China; and (4) search on individuals 
managers of sample firms on the internet. The process of identifying specific 




Country- and industry-level variables are obtained from China Statistical 
Yearbook (CSY) and China Electronics Industry Yearbook (CEIY), which is 
published by the Publishing House of Electronics Industry, a unit of China’s 
Ministry of Information Industry.  
I use the 50% threshold to define foreign ownership. I chose to use the 
sum of foreign ownership instead of the ultimate owner used by recent study 
(Kosova, 2004). Although foreign parents may not have the ultimate control in 
a multiple-owner firm, they bring more advanced technology and managerial 
skills to the firm, which clearly pose a competitive edge against domestic 
firms. Therefore, the sum of foreign ownership is more relevant to my study 
compared with the ultimate ownership. The final sample I use to estimate firm 
exit has eleven years’ firm-level data points, which after removing cases with 
missing and extreme values on key variables, resulted in 248 firms, 1452 valid 
firm-year observations.  
I address the issue of variable definition and operationalization at some 
length next. I discuss the measurement of the key dependent and independent 
variables as well as the controls variables in Section 4.3.  
 
4.3 Variables  
 
4.3.1. Dependent variable 
 
Exit 
Exit is measured by a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 0 or 




segment or ceased to operate as a corporation. Then in my empirical analyses, 
I set the variable, Exitit, equal to 1 in the year when a domestic firm exits and 0 
for all prior years. Firms that survive until the year 2003 are recorded as 
having Exitit=0.  
Exit from the industry was recorded in two situations: when the firm 
ceased operation on its own accord (Dissolution) or when it was acquired by 
another firm (Acquisition)3. This measurement of exit through acquisition is 
consistent with measuring industry participation at the parent level: a change 
of ownership of the business unit is treated as a change of the firm itself 
(Mitchell, 1988); however change at levels above this, such as when a holding 
company sold its ownership of the parent firm, was not recorded as exit. 
Dissolution and acquisition events are reported in China Electronic News. A 
total of 136 exits by 330 firms over 11 years were identified. Among these 136 
exits, 110 were by dissolution, and 26 by acquisition.  
 









                                                 








Political ties at the organization level 
 
A firm is considered politically connected at the organizational level if 
it is:  
(a) Owned by the state. State-owned enterprises are politically connected 
through their government ownership. Huang (2003) has intensively 
documented the strategic behaviors of Chinese SOEs after massive inflow of 
FDI during the reform era, and concluded that government ownership is a key 
factor that determines its strategy. Recent empirical results (Li, Zhang & Zhou, 
2006) have also shown that Chinese SOEs are less likely to exit in market 
transition. 
 
(b) Member of “qualified TV makers” (dingdian qiye) group. This is an 
industry-specific measure. In the 1980s, the Chinese government appointed 58 
“qualified TV makers”, receiving most governmental support (Marukawa, 
2001). These 58 firms spread across every province and municipality, and are 
thus less likely to be chosen based on their capabilities. The “qualified TV 
maker” group measures an important affiliation of a firm with the political 






Political ties at the managerial level (see Table 4.5 on need for more specific 
details of all variables) 
 
Managers view their personal ties – particularly their political ties – as 
a business secret. Therefore, researchers often ask broad questions regarding 
firms’ connections, namely to ask the extent (usually on a five- or seven-point 
scale) to which managers utilized or spent effort on cultivating ties (Xin & 
Pearce, 1996; Peng & Luo, 2000; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). While these 
measures provide managers’ perception of the firm’s utilization of or efforts 
spent in cultivating ties, the firm’s actual ties cannot be identified by this 
approach. For instance, firms that devote significantly more resources in 
cultivating ties may not enjoy stronger connections with officials because 
some of their peers may be “endowed” with better ties and need less effort in 
cultivating these ties. As summarized by Siegel (2004, 2007), it is important to 
place greater attention on the more observable ties originating from firms’ 
shareholders or executives.   
Drawing on prior research in measuring political ties through 
connectedness between the firm and government agencies (Bertrand et al., 
2005; Chung et al, 2008; Faccio, 2006; Siegel, 2007), I measure managerial 
political ties by directly assessing the positional overlap between the firm’s 
top management team and the political system. Specifically, a firm was 
considered having managerial ties if:  
(a) The firm’s CEO/chairman/executives were currently serving or previously 
served in the government agencies and ministries (at various levels). For 




deputy director of Bureau of Electronics of Huhehaote City between 1980-
1985; therefore the firm was coded as politically connected to the government 
through Zheng Weian. 
 
(b) The firm’s CEO/chairman/executives were currently members or used to 
be members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (the 
highest administrative body of the party), or members of various provincial or 
municipal committee of the Communist Party. One such example is Xiangfan 
TV Works, which was treated as having political ties after 1994 through its 
president, Zhang Jianyi, who was on the Xiangfan Municipal Committee of 
Communist Party from 1994 to 1995. 
 
(c) The firm’s CEO/chairman/executives were currently or were previously on 
the Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or Committee at the 
provincial or municipal levels. Haier Group was regarded as having political 
ties to the NPC through its now-chairman, then-assistant-factory-manager, 
Yang mianmian, who has been a member of NPC since 1988. 
 
(d) The firm’s CEO/chairman/executives were currently or previously on the 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), at national or/and local levels. Shenzhen Chuangwei-RGB 
Electronics Ltd., for example, was connected through its president, Huang 
Hongsheng, who was a member of the CPPCC Shenzhen Municipal 
Committee in 1997 and since has been a member of the CPPCC Committee at 




Measures (a) to (d) were based on the political hierarchy of China, 
with the agencies being key administrative agencies. (c) and (d), together, 
represent ties to the country’s legislative institutions. Membership of the PC or 
CPPCC is valuable to firm managers not only because it gives them some 
measure of political power, but also because it makes it easier for these 
managers to cultivate social ties with important government bureaucrats who 
are also members of the two organizations (Li, Meng & Zhang, forthcoming).  
 
There are two broad steps in identifying firms’ managerial ties, coding 
firms’ current ties and the historical ties. To obtain data on current political 
ties, I first coded the names of the chairman of the board, CEO (general 
manager), and divisional managers of each firm. These names were provided 
by Wanfang Data Company. I then collected data of prime position holders of 
the four major political agencies identified above. The names of keys officers 
were coded from (1) websites of central, provincial and municipal 
governments; (2) websites of the PC and CPPCC, at central, provincial and 
municipal levels, respectively; (3) Xinhua News Agency, the state news 
agency of China. Next, I matched the names of firm managers with those in 
the major political institutions to identify position overlaps.  
Second, as political ties are a time-varying resource, I referred to China 
VIPs to identify firm executives’ political background. This book lists a total 
of 4,828 names and positions of key personnel in China, including leading 
government officials, persons of political, military, academic and economic 
importance. For each listed individual, details on his or her background were 




before they joined the firm. This approach was complemented by internet 
searches of each executive and through historical news reports. In sum, firms’ 
political ties at the managerial level, to the government and ministries, to key 
legislative agencies (i.e. PC and CPPCC), and the ruling party were detected 
and coded. Each link for an individual manager was counted as one tie. The 
total number of ties for each firm allowed me to measure the strength of each 
firm’s managerial ties by summing the number of ties.  
In sum, among 248 firms, 182 are SOE, 58 are qualified makers, 31 are 
connected through managers, and 7 are connected at both organizational and 
managerial levels.  
 
Regional economic development. Regional economic development is 
measured by Provincial GDP, i.e. GDP per capita in each province, 
autonomous regions and centrally administered municipalities.  
 
Market development. Market development is measured by the 
proportion of the gross output value produced by private firms in the economy 
to that of SOEs. In my robustness check, I also adopted measures such as 
number of individuals employed in the private sector divided by number 
employed in state-owned sector (Keister, 2001; Li et al, forthcoming).  
 
Legal effectiveness. Legal effectiveness is measured by number of 
cases filed by court divided by total population annually. Specifically, cases 
filed by courts refer to cases accepted by People’s Courts according to the first 




of law in China, and argues that this index measures the trust that people have 
in the legal system4. This index was adopted by recent studies to measure 
effective legal protection in a locality (Li et al, forthcoming).  
 
Market Uncertainty. Market uncertainty is operationalized as the 
degree that realized industry sales deviate from the forecasted value of 
industry sales. To do so, I first predicted industry sales at t, given the time 
series of industry sales observed till t-1. The market uncertainty is then 
calculated as the absolute percentage difference between forecasted industry 
sales and the realized value of industry sales (Anderson & Tushman, 2001). A 
simpler measure of variance of industry sales has also been utilized in my 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
4.3.3 Control variables 
 
I employed a set of firm, industry and economy control variables likely to 




Size. Firm size has been viewed as an indicator of scale economies and 
market power. Larger firms may be less likely to exit (e.g. Baum & Oliver, 
1991; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983). Size is measured by the logarithmic 
transformation of each firm’s total employees.  
                                                 
4 Lu and Yao (2005) also used the ratio of closed cases to all commercial court cases in a year as a 
measure for the effectiveness of legal system. However, this measure has little variation for 2002. Thus, 





Age. Empirical studies have demonstrated that mortality rate tends to 
decline with firm age (Carroll & Delacrois, 1982; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 
1983). Age was defined as the number of years since corporate foundation.  
 
Diversification. Whether a firm is Diversified determines competitive 
pressures and resources available. Domestic firms’ level of diversification is 
measured by a count variable which counts the number of industrial segment 
with different 2-digit SIC code from SIC3651 (household audio and video 
equipment), the primary code for TV manufacturers.  
 
Export/Import Permit. Since a global presence may likely influence 
domestic firms’ response strategies toward the entry of MNCs (Wu & 
Pangarkar, 2006), firms’ international presence is controlled by a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has a Permit to export.  
 
Geographic region. Since competition in China was to a large extent 
regionalized by provincial boundaries (Chang & Xu, 2006), I created seven 
region dummies to control for different regional government policies, 
economic development and competitive pressure. The Shanghai Security 
Exchange divides mainland China into eight parts according to each region’s 
aggregate GDP levels, industrial structure, infrastructure facilities, degree of 
openness, scale of markets, residential consumption levels and growth 
prospects. The eight regions are Northeastern (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and 




Coastal (Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang), Southern Coastal (Fujian, 
Guangdong, and Hainan), Middle Huang River (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, and 
Neimenggu), Middle Yangzi River (Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangxi), 
Southwestern (Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqin, and Guangxi), and 




Industry density. Ecological studies have shown that firms’ mortality 
rates vary according to the number or density of firms in a particular industry 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1988). Industry density is measured by the number of 
firms operating in the TV manufacturing industry annually.  
 
Foreign competition. The competitive pressure arising from direct 
FDI was controlled for by adding percentage of foreign sales in total annual 
industry sales.  
 
Import competition. Competition arising from imports is found to 
influence firm strategy (Bowen & Wiersema, 2006). Similarly to foreign 
competition, import competition is measured by the percentage of imports to 








Economic & Institutional Controls 
 
FDI inflow. The total annual FDI Inflow is included as a general 
economic control in my empirical model.  
 
Year Dummies 
Eleven years are grouped into eight groups due to a “perfect failure 
determination” problem, similar to that described by Kosova (2004). Table 4.4 
demonstrates this problem: for instance, there is no exit during 2003, so the 
coefficients on the year dummy of 2003 would be negative infinity. Therefore, 
I combined 2003 and 2002 to make a new year-dummy, 2002&2003, so that 
there is variation in exit. Similar steps were taken for dependent variables 
“acquisition” and “dissolution”.  
A list of the variables and brief descriptions are presented in Table 4.5.   
 
*** Table 4.5 about here *** 
 
4.4 Model Specification 
 
The problem of left-censoring and right-censoring are common for 
time based analyses. For instance, some firms may be at the risk of exit prior 
to my study period. So the beginning of the duration may be unknown for 
these cases, which is known as left-censoring. There was almost no market-
seeking FDI (with the limited scale Hitachi operation as an exception) in 




major foreign TV manufacturers avoids the left-censoring problem. In other 
cases, events (i.e. exit) may not have occurred at the end of my study, which is 
known as right-censoring.  
The body of techniques known as event history or survival analysis 
(Allison, 1984; Blossfeld, Hamerle & Mayer, 1989; Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 
1980; Lee, 1992) is designed to evaluate the likelihood of a particular event 
occurring within a specific time interval. Such technique is able to account for 
the right-censored problem. This is a significant advantage in the present study, 
since 195 of the 330 firms in my sample (59.1%) had not exited at the end of 
the study period.  
The basic model of event history analysis is the examination of the 
time interval between a subject being placed at risk of an event and the actual 
occurrence of that event. When there is one non-repeatable event being 
tracked and the duration of the event is measured continuously, this model is 
that of a “continuous time, discrete state stochastic process” (Blossfeld et al., 
1989: 27), for which the rate of change of state is measured by the hazard rate. 
The probability of an event occurring in the time interval (t, t+ t∆ ) conditional 
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where X(t) represents a vector of covariates measured at time t.  
I estimate firm exit and mode of exit by two types of event history 
techniques. First, I use event history analysis for continuous data, as in reality 
firm survival is a continuous not a discrete variable. Specifically, I use a 
parametric Log-logistic model, which assumes a non-monotonic hazard rate 




by discrete intervals-years. Hence I also use discrete methods, namely logistic 
model, to assure the robustness of my log-logistic results5. If the results are 
robust they should be similar across different specifications. More details 
about individual methods are below. 
 
4.4.1 Log-logistic Regression 
 
The standard log-logistic distribution is a 2 parameter distribution with 













where λ  is the parameter that scales the time effect and determines when the 
hazard rate peaks. The second parameter, p, is the shape parameter and 
indicates the pattern of the hazard rate. The log-logistic is a flexible 
distribution, taking on a monotonically declining shape when 1≤p  
(representing a declining hazard rate) or a non-monotonous inverted U shape 
when 1>p  (indicating an initially increasing then declining hazard rate).  
The following process was used to determine the suitability of the 
choice of the log-logistic model for the present study. As a first step, the 
hazard rate was computed and graphed by the statistical software, STATA. As 
shown in the set of Figures 4.4a-c, the hazard rates for exit, exit through 
dissolution, and exit through acquisition are all non-monotonous, initially 
                                                 
5 The Logistic model is employed in my sensitivity analyses. The results produced are not presented in 




increasing and then decreasing. This suggests that the choice of log-logistic 
distribution is appropriate6.  
 
***Figures 4.5a, b &c about here*** 
 
In addition to the assumed underlying distribution, three important 
assumptions need to be satisfied in the survival analysis. First, subgroups 
within the sample experience the same hazard rate. This was tested for firms 
with and without political ties. Figure 4.5, for instance, demonstrates that 
qualified maker and non-qualified maker had approximately parallel survivor 
function, supporting the validity of this assumption. Second, censoring should 
not be systematically related to the occurrence of events. This condition is 
reasonably satisfied as censoring only occurs at the end of the study period. 
Third, unobserved heterogeneity is not significant. Besides including sets of 
firm, industry and environment control variables to reduce the likelihood of 
unobserved heterogeneity, I also tested for frailty (i.e. unobserved 
heterogeneity) for my sample using LR test. It shows that unobserved 
heterogeneity is not a problem in my study.  
 




                                                 
6 I also estimated lognormal model, which also allows for non-monotone hazard rates. However, Log-
logistic model had maximum likelihood function higher in most cases and thus lower Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), which is one way how to choose the proper distribution. AIC = ¡2(log 
likelihood) + 2(p + k), where p is the number of ancillary parameters in the particular model and k is the 
number of regressors including constant. Since p and k are the same in lognormal and log-logistic the 




4.4.2 Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression is a discrete-time hazard rate model, when used 
with yearly-spell event history data. The discrete time hazard rate Pit defines 
the conditional probability of an event for subject i occurring at time t, given 
that it has not yet occurred: 
),|Pr( itiiitit XtTtTP ≥==  
The hazard rate can be modeled as the logistic regression function as follows: 






log( βα +=−  
This model indicates that for each subject i, the odds of event occurring at 
time t is determined by the vector of covariates Xit. The log odds of event Pi 
has a linear association with the vector of covariates.  
For both log-logistic and logistic models, to control for causality, I 
used a one-year lag between explanatory variables and dependent variables, 
resulting in the loss of observations for 2003. I corrected the standard errors 
for potential heteroscedasticity and arbitrary correlations between firm 








CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the tests of hypotheses. The first 
section provides summary and descriptive statistics for the data employed. The 
following section presents and interprets results. This chapter ends with 
findings from sensitivity analyses to test the reliability of results. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
A total of 136 exits by 330 firms over 11 years were identified in my 
pre-cleaned data, which gives a 41.1% exit rate. Figure 5.1 plots the annual 
exit rate over these years7. Among these 136 exits, 110 were by dissolution, 
and 26 by acquisition.  
 
*** Figure 5.1 *** 
 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables utilized in this 
dissertation. It shows that political ties in general are negatively correlated 
with firm dissolution and positively correlated with acquisition. The number 
of political ties for firms ranged from 0 to 3 8 . For example, Shenzhen 
Chuangwei-RGB Electronics Ltd. had three political ties, all linked to the 
CPPCC, at the central, provincial, and municipal levels through its managers.  
                                                 
7 Exit rates are calculated as the ratio: dj/nj; where dj = number of firms which exit at tj and nj = number 
of all firms at tj in my sample.  
8 There is not a large variation in the number of ties; however, the 0 to 3 variation is reasonable 






*** Table 5.1 about here *** 
 
5.2 Political Ties and Exit 
 
Hypothesis 1 relates political ties with firms’ likelihood of exit, and 
predicts that the likelihood of exit will first drop then increase with the 
increasing number of political ties. Table 5.2 reports log-logistic estimates that 
test this hypothesis, distinguishing organizational ties (SOE and qualified firm) 
and managerial ties. Note that the dependent variable is survival, thus relevant 
interpretation requires change of signs. Hypothesis 1 is partially supported. 
Managerial ties exert a curvilinear influence on firms’ exit, first reducing then 
increasing firms’ likelihood of exit (Columns 4&5). This is consistent with my 
earlier argument that political ties may incur high opportunity costs and 
maintaining costs. The possession of a few ties will be associated with greater 
advantages than costs, but beyond an optimal level, such ties may imply 
greater costs than benefits. Based on results in Column 4, firms are more 
likely to exit when the number of managerial ties becomes larger than 1.359. 
On the other hand, just contrary to my prediction, being a qualified firm 
decreases firms’ mean survival time by 19.75% (Column 2) 10 . Better 
understanding of this result may require closer examination of the mode of 
exit, which will be discussed shortly. Turning to SOE, it shows that being an 






SOE is not significantly related to firms’ likelihood of exit following 
substantial foreign entry.  
Turning to control variables, the results indicate that larger, and more 
diversified firms are more able to withstand the competitive entry by MNCs, 
thus are more likely to survive. In terms of industry control, MNC competition, 
measured by the share of foreign sales to total sales, has a consistent positive 
effect on firm exit, indicating that domestic firms are more likely to exit the 
industrial segment when competitive intensity arising from foreign firms is 
high. As an economy control, FDI inflow has a negative effect on firm exit, 
indicating that domestic firms in the TV manufacturing industry may benefit 
from the spillover effects of economy-wide FDI inflow, and are thus less 
likely to exit when there is great FDI inflow into the economy.  
 
*** Table 5.2 about here *** 
 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b takes a closer look at firms’ exit decisions, and 
relate political ties to different modes of exit, namely, whether the firm 
stopped operation on its own or is acquired by another firm. Specifically, I 
predict that political ties are positively related to firms’ likelihood of being 
acquired and negatively related to firms’ likelihood of dissolution. Table 5.3 
presents results that support the set of Hypotheses 2a and 2b11. Similar to the 
results for total exit, being an SOE does not have a significant effect on 
acquisition or dissolution. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, firms with more 
                                                 
11 Effects of political ties on dissolution and acquisition are estimated by two approaches: (1) dissolution 
and acquisition are treated as competing-risk events; (2) the likelihoods of dissolution and acquisition are 
compared with that of non-exit, respectively. Two approaches produced similar results, so only the 




managerial ties are less likely to dissolve. Specifically, 1 more managerial tie 
will decrease firms’ likelihood of dissolution by 53.27%12 (Column 1).  
Being a qualified maker significantly increases firms’ likelihood of 
being acquired by 54.25%13 (Column 2). The negative coefficient of qualified 
maker on survival (as compared to exit through acquisition) exactly explains 
the earlier negative coefficient of qualified maker on survival (as compared to 
total exit). In other words, the earlier positive effects of ties on firms’ 
likelihood of exit are driven by exit through acquisition, in the sense that firms 
affiliated to the political agencies (i.e. qualified maker) are more likely to be 
acquired following foreign entry, thus more likely to exit in general. Turning 
to control variables, large, more diversified firms are less likely to dissolve. 
MNC competition is the major factor driving domestic firms out of the market 
regardless being acquired or stopped operation on its own accord.  
 
*** Table 5.3 about here *** 
 
The results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that both organizational and 
managerial level ties are important influences on firm exit, not necessarily 
which one is stronger than the other, thus the set of Hypotheses 3a and 3b is 
only partially supported (Hypothesis 3b). Specifically, managerial ties seem to 
have a greater effect on dissolution exit (Column 1, Table 5.3), meaning that 
firms connected through top executives are less likely to dissolve. On the other 
hand, organizational ties have a greater impact on acquisition exit (Column 2, 
Table 5.3), suggesting that firms affiliated with the state are more likely to be 
                                                 





sold to acquirers, which might arise from the government’s political and social 
objectives. The contrasting results suggest that the impacts of organizational 
and managerial ties on firm exit may not lie in the strength/degree of their 
impacts, but may lie in the mechanisms through which organizational vis-à-vis 
managerial ties influence firm exit.  
 
5.3 Tie Destinations with Varying Resources 
 
Next, I examine the effects of different types of ties on firms’ exit 
decisions. The Hypotheses 4a and 4b predict that ties linked to the institutions 
with greater resources have a stronger effect on firm exit. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
present results that relate firm exit with two manifestations of political 
resources, i.e. political institutions at different levels and ties linked to 
different power sources. Table 5.4 relates firm exit with political ties at central 
and local levels, while Table 5.5 explores how firm exit are affected by 
political ties linked to different power sources, namely, the government, the 
legislative body, and the political party, respectively.  
 
5.3.1 Ties at Different Levels  
 
The results do not provide support for the argument that ties linked to 
political institutions at the central level exert stronger effect than those to local 
ones. On the contrary, it indicates just the opposite: local managerial ties 
significantly affect firms’ likelihood of being acquired (Table 5.4, Column 6) 




effect on firm exit and mode of exit. Specifically, 1 more managerial tie to the 
local political institutions will increase firms’ likelihood of being acquired by 
26.80%14. The strong effect of local ties suggest that although the central 
government is the highest-level political institution in China, after two decades 
of decentralization, local governments have been delegated with sufficient 
decision rights, and are now able to “formulate their own policies that attract 
investment and govern business operations under their jurisdiction” (Child & 
Tse, 2001: 8). Moreover, local politicians also have strong incentives to 
promote the local economy, attract mobile factors and to obtain fiscal revenues 
in order to compete for grant from the central government (Qian & Roland 
1998). As a result, troubled firms in a province/city are more likely to be sold 
to attract inward investment in that locality. These results contrary to my prior 
predictions indicate that evaluation of value of political ties (a subset of social 
network ties) needs to be closely linked to the institutional environment that 
the firms are embedded in, because, after all, economic relations are embedded 
within larger social, political and legal context (Granovetter, 1973, 1985).  
 
*** Table 5.4 about here *** 
 
5.3.2 Ties to Different Power Sources  
 
The results in Table 5.5 suggest that ties to government and ministry 
officers have a positive effect on firms’ likelihood of being acquired. 
Specifically, 1 more government tie will increase firms’ likelihood of being 
                                                 
14 I have also created a new indicator variable, Local, taking the value of 1 if the tie is linked to local 
political institutions, regardless of at the organizational or managerial level. Unfortunately, I did not 




acquired by 49.24% (Table 5.5, Column 7). This strong effect of government 
ties on acquisition exit also drives the significant negative effect on firm 
survival in general (Column 1). This finding supports Hypothesis 4b, which 
predicts that tie destinations with more resources (government vis-à-vis the 
legislature and the political parties in China) have a greater impact on firm exit. 
Meanwhile, while Hypothesis 4a is not supported, interestingly, it shows that 
legislature tie has a strong negative effect on firm dissolution, meaning that 1 
more tie to PC or/and CPPCC will decrease firms’ likelihood of dissolution by 
83.31% (Column 5).  
Combining the effect of government ties on acquisition and the effect 
of legislature ties on dissolution, it may imply that following competitive 
foreign entry, for firms that incur greater costs than benefits to continue 
operating, the most desirable choice is to sell off, in which scenario the 
government can exert direct influence by making policies and negotiating a 
deal; on the other hand, ties to the legislative bodies have weaker influence 
and may only be able to provide firms with resources and legitimacy which 
allow them to stay on longer in the competition. In sum, the set of Hypotheses 
4 are broadly supported, that government ties exert the strongest influence on 
firm exit. However, we need to note from the results that, first, the legislature 
(PC and CPPCC) are not simply rubber stamp in China – they demonstrate 
impacts on firms; second, ties linked to different political institutions have 
different effect on different exit choices.  
 





5.4 The Timing of Impact 
 
5.4.1 The “Until when” Question 
 
To examine the timing effect of political ties on dissolution exit and 
acquisition exit, respectively, I also conducted 2-year and 3-year exit analyses 
of my sample firms. The 2-year exit analysis includes every second calendar 
year, beginning with the second year since 1993. The 3-year analysis includes 
every third year, beginning with the third year since 1993. This procedure 
eliminates serial autocorrelation that would result if I included overlapping 
year spells in the 2-year and 3-year exit models (Singh & Mitchell, 2005). 
Tables 5.6a&b report three periods of exit through dissolution and exit through 
acquisition, respectively. Columns 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9 of Table 5.6a report the 
results for the 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year dissolution exit analyses, respectively. 
Tables 5.6b follows similar format.  
 
*** Tables 5.6a&b about here *** 
 
Table 5.6c summarizes the results from previous 2 tables. Broadly, the 
results are consistent with Hypotheses 5a and 5b. The effects of political ties 
on firm exit through dissolution are only significant for the first time period, 
indicating an immediate rather than a long-term effect of ties on dissolution. 
This is consistent with my prediction that the effect of political ties on survival 
may not be able to hold, due to the lower efficiency allowed by the political 




ties on acquisition exit last till the second or third time period, indicating a 
sustaining effect of ties on acquisition.  
 
*** Table 5.6c about here *** 
 
5.4.2 The “Since when” Question 
Two results are worth noting in Tables 5.6a-c. First, the effect of 
managerial ties on acquisition starts to kick in only from the second time 
period, suggesting a longer time lag for managerial ties to influence 
acquisition than dissolution. This shows that managerial ties have an earlier 
impact on dissolution exit than that on acquisition exit, and have a later impact 
on acquisition than organizational ties. Second, ties to the legislature also start 
to influence on acquisition from the second time period. Linking back to the 
immediate effects of legislature on dissolution, as well as my prediction of a 
stronger, direct impact of government ties on acquisition exit, the longer time 
lag of effect of legislature ties on acquisition suggest that legislature ties do 
have a significant, yet later impact on firms’ likelihood of being acquired 
compared to government ties, due to the legislature’s relatively indirect power 
over and access to resources. This is consistent with my prediction in 
Hypothesis 6: Ties linked to destinations with greater access to resources will 








5.5 Effects of Political Ties across Economic Conditions 
 
It has been shown by the previous results that political ties matter, but 
a more intriguing question is: where do political tie matter most? The set of 
Hypotheses 7a – 7c consider the contingent effect of macro-economic 
development in different regions in a country, and predict that political ties 
will exert a stronger effect on firm exit in poorer regions. Hypotheses 7a – 7c 
are partially supported by results reported in Tables 5.7a-c: interaction effects 
between political ties (particularly local ties) and regional GDP per capita are 
significant for total exits (Table 5.7a), but not for dissolution (Table 5.7b) or 
acquisition exit (Table 5.7c).  
 
*** Tables 5.7a-c about here *** 
 
Table 5.7a indicates a strong interaction effect between political ties 
and regional economic development. What is worth noting is that, local 
managerial ties have a stronger effect on firm exit in poorer regions. The 
negative main effect of local ties and positive interaction term (Column 5) 
indicate that domestic firms with local managerial ties are more likely to exit 
following foreign entry in regions with weaker macroeconomic conditions, 
which is primarily driven by exit through acquisition. This is consistent with 
my argument that there is greater need for business-government coalition in 
less developed areas. Meanwhile, both organizational and managerial ties have 
a stronger effect in regions with a lower GDP. Moreover, government ties and 




indicating a strong moderating effect of regional economic conditions on the 
relationship between political ties and firm exit.  
 
5.6 Political Ties in Institutional Transition  
 
My last set of hypotheses (H8 and H9) focus on major manifestation of 
the market transition, and proposed that the impacts of political ties will 
decrease with installation of better market and legal institutions, and increase 
with higher level of uncertainty originated from transition. I thus test the 
moderation of institutional development and market uncertainty separately in 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9, respectively – Table 5.8 tests the moderation effects of 
market development and legal effectiveness, while Table 5.9 focuses on the 
moderation of market uncertainty. 
Results in Table 5.8 on the whole support Hypotheses 8a and 8b. 
Columns 5, 8 and 9 of Table 5.8 reports results that support Hypotheses 8a and 
8b: the negative effect of political ties on firms’ likelihood of dissolution 
becomes stronger in environment with weaker market development, and the 
positive effect of ties on firms’ likelihood of getting acquired becomes 
stronger in environment with lower level of legal effectiveness. These results 
support the view that social ties act as a substitute to formal, structural market-
support institutions.  
 





Hypothesis 9 examines the moderating effect of market uncertainty on 
the relationship between political ties and exit. Table 5.9 reports related results. 
Results in Table 5.9 moderately support my predictions. The results show that, 
in general, firms are less likely to dissolve during periods of high uncertainty, 
consistent with Dixit’s (1989) view that firms tend to “wait” for future 
opportunities in uncertain environment. Turning to the moderating effect of 
uncertainty on the tie-exit relationship, firms with local ties are more likely to 
be acquired following foreign entry; and this effect gets stronger in more 
uncertain environment (Column 5). These results demonstrate that in relatively 
stable environment, politically connected firms are more likely to stay in the 
competition, whereas as uncertainty level goes up, political ties allow 
executives in the connected firms to sell off and obtain the residual value. 
Hypothesis 9 is thus partially supported as the connected firms are more likely 
to be acquired in highly uncertain environment.  
 
*** Table 5.9 about here *** 
 
5.7 Sensitivity Analysis  
 
5.7.1 Unobserved heterogeneity  
 
Although prior LR tests indicate no problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity, I estimate the specifications with firm-level means as additional 
controls (Kosova, 2004), to explicitly model firm unobserved heterogeneity as 




Mundlak (1978) version of Chamberlain’s assumption that unobserved 
heterogeneity can be modeled as a function of firm level means of included 
repressors. Then the error term, iµ , in the structural model is now divided into 
two parts, namely, 
iii aX += εµ '
, where 'iX  is the vector of firm level means 
of individual regressors over the period a firm is observed and ai is that part of 





itX . My results in general did not show significant changes after adding 
the firm-level means.  
 
5.7.2 Prior performance 
 
Prior performance could be a factor driving firms out of the market. I 
did not include prior performance in my main analyses, because more than 
half of the values are missing. Theoretically, excluding prior performance in 
the present study is less likely to create problem, as prior performance may 
have a weak influence on firms’ endowed political ties, despite that poor-
performing firms may try to establish more informal social linkages, which is 
beyond the scope of this study. However, to test models with prior 
performance as an explanatory variable, I first ran regressions on firm 
profitability based on a sub-sample of 122 firms, 642 firm-year observations 
with non-missing profit values 15 . I then added the predicted value of 
profitability in my main models as a control variable. Results in Table 5.10 
show that, even after including prior performance, firms’ political ties have 
                                                 




significant effect on firm exit – allowing domestic firms to survive longer. 
Meanwhile, it is indicated that poorly performing domestic firms are more 
likely to dissolve following competitive foreign entry.  
 
*** Table 5.10 about here *** 
 
5.7.3 Political ties measured as a dummy variable  
 
As the variation of the independent variable, political ties, is not great, 
I have also measured firms’ political ties as a dichotomous variable, taking the 
value of 1 if having one or more than one ties, 0 otherwise. Results in Table 
5.11 are consistent with my prior findings: connected firms are less likely to 
dissolve following competitive foreign entry than their unconnected peers.  
 




This chapter has discussed the empirical findings of my. Table 5.12 
summarizes the results for hypotheses testing. The stability of these results 
after extensive sensitivity analyses suggests that the findings are robust. The 
evaluations of alternate explanations have also clarified the appropriateness of 
result interpretation. In general, the results support the importance of political 




foreign entry, and identified conditions where political ties might be most 
critical.  













6.1 A Summary 
 
I study domestic firms’ choice of exit as an important strategic reaction 
in response to competitive foreign entry. Drawing on resource-base view, 
political economics and social capital theory, I study how domestic firms’ 
political ties influence their exit decisions in response to foreign entry, 
specifically, the likelihood and timing of dissolution and being acquired. I 
approach this research question by developing three clusters of hypotheses. 
Specifically, I distinguish firms’ political ties at organizational and managerial 
levels, as well as ties linked to political institutions at different levels and with 
different identities. Further, adopting a dynamic view on political ties, I 
examine the timing issue, i.e. to what extent are the effects of political ties 
sustainable on firm exit and since when the effects of ties will start to kick in. 
Finally, I explore the varying effects of different ties on firm exit across 
environmental factors, namely, the macro-economic conditions, the 
development in institutional environment and uncertainty originating from the 
market transition process.  
Using a sample of Chinese TV manufacturing firms during 1993-2003, 
my empirical results suggest that political connections were important 
influences on firm exit throughout my study period, positively affecting firms’ 




dissolution. Consistent with my predictions, ties with different origins and 
destinations carry different resources, thus having varying impacts on firms’ 
exit decisions. Specifically, managerial ties allow firms to survive longer, 
while organizational ties facilitate firms’ sell-off decisions. In addition, along 
with the decentralization process in a transition economy such as China, local 
ties exert stronger effect on firm exit and exit through acquisition than central 
ties, particularly in regions with lower economic development. Moreover, ties 
to the government agencies and ministries have a stronger and earlier impact 
on firm exit than ties to legislative bodies and the Communist Party. Further, 
political ties do not have perpetual effect on firm survival: the effects of ties 
on dissolution exit decline with time. Finally, I find that the value political tie 
varies in environments characterized with different levels of institutional 
development and market uncertainty: the impacts of political ties become 
stronger in environment with weaker legal effectiveness and market 
development, and in environment with higher level of market uncertainty.  
 
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
 
This study has a broad set of theoretical implications. First, by taking 
political ties as a firm resource, this dissertation expands and enriches 
resource-based view of strategy by “adding a political component that is 
largely missing in that literature, which ignores political resources and 
competitive methods” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 135). To complement 
prior researchers’ search for economic and organization resources, the present 




the political system can be valuable for firms in the face of emerging and 
intensifying foreign competition.  
Further, I decompose the concept of political ties and conduct detailed 
analyses on ties at different levels, and ties with different origins and 
destinations, which are broadly missing in the extant literature. Moreover, 
adopting dynamic view and contingency perspective on political ties, this 
study evaluates the timing and environmental boundary conditions of political 
ties, improving understanding of the dynamic and contingent value of political 
ties and social capital in general. For instance, one important finding to the 
social capital theory is that social ties, as one firm resource, do not have 
perpetual impact. Rather, it has its limit up to a certain time line. This implies 
that firms still need to combine their external social resources with the more 
sustainable, internal resources to achieve long-term success. Moreover, the 
varying effects of political ties also reflect how the value of external 
connections are enhanced or reduced by the changing external environment 
(Adler & Kwon, 2001).  
Third, the adoption of a domestic-firm perspective contributes to 
studies of international business. Most studies in this research stream focus on 
strategy and management of multinational corporations (MNCs), taking 
domestic competitors as less important or passive players (Chang & Xu, 2006; 
Li & Shenkar, 1996). Considering domestic firms as proactive players 
following substantial competitive foreign entry, this study broadens the one-
sided view of domestic-foreign competitive dynamics, and intends to push the 
research frontier from the MNC-dominated paradigm to the other side of the 




Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study of 
formal political ties in the transition economy of China that evaluates effects 
of ties with different origins and destinations. Despite a considerable amount 
of research done on the social and political aspects of guanxi networks in 
China (Xin & Pearce, 1996; Park & Luo, 2001; Peng & Luo, 2000), studies 
often focused on identifying the “resources spent on building and maintaining” 
ties and managerial perception of ties. The important formal political ties 
arising from position overlaps have been under-researched. Several recent 
studies have started to examine the effect of political ties on access to bank 
loans and firm performance, but the ties examined are limited to one or two 
aspects such as party membership (Li et al., forthcoming) and identity of 
former government bureaucrat (Fan & Wong, 2004), thus opportunities of 
comprehensive analyses of formal political ties in China are warranted.  
 
6.3 Managerial Implications 
 
This study has important managerial implications by providing insights 
into competitive reaction and implications for both domestic and foreign firms. 
The entry of MNCs into emerging economies is often viewed as a competitive 
shock and threat, if not a death sentence to the domestic firms. By 
demonstrating the strategic reactions that domestic firms can actually take in 
response to foreign entrants and by empirically examining how political ties 
can affect domestic firms’ strategic choice, this study provide insights for local 




managers in MNCs will also benefit by understanding the competitive 
behaviors and outcomes of the domestic players.     
 
6.4 Policy Implications                    
 
My study also has implications for FDI policies, competition policies 
and regulations to support domestic industries. It becomes the policy priorities 
of many governments to attractive FDI, as it is generally believed that FDIs 
have the potential to contribute to the economic development of the host 
country through primary and various secondary channels. However, this 
dissertation raises important policy questions on the impact of FDI. Clearly, 
the benefits of FDI are substantially reduced if the entry of foreign firms is 
accompanied by substantial exit of domestic firms, particularly if such exit 
undermines the domestic industry. Therefore, those policies focused on 
attracting FDI might not be justified, especially at the firm level and in 
developing countries. If policy interventions are able to influence the amount 
of FDI inflow, it is critical for policy makers to attract FDI while at the same 
time create an encouraging environment for domestic firms to compete, 
collaborate and learn from the MNCs.  
 
6.5 Limitations and Future Research 
 
Though this study has provided significant details of different types of 
political ties, I also recognize limitations in identifying political ties. I have 




addressed the issue of informal ties, which are formed through family, 
marriage, historical friendship and other personal associations. These ties exist 
widely in many economies, and can have great impact like formal political ties 
(Chung et al., 2008; Faccio, 2006). Further analysis exploring the impact of 
informal political ties and the interplay of formal and informal ties together 
offers substantial research potential.  
Next, a closer look at the heterogeneity of ties might be an interesting 
follow-up study. The number of ties may not necessarily be the most 
influential factor, as linkages to politicians with different political and social 
interests may place a firm in a dilemmatic situation, which might hurt the 
firm’s eventual survival and performance. A study that aims to explore 
heterogeneous ties with different political interests warrants a deeper 
understanding of the values of connections.  
Moreover, this study has shown that political ties have a limited life 
span in influencing firm dissolution, allowing connected firms to survive until 
they get acquired or dissolve. This finding suggests that solely relying on 
political ties has limited influence on firms’ long-term survival and 
performance; it again boils down to the internal intangible assets such as 
firms’ technological and managerial capabilities. It would be interesting to 
examine how political ties interplay with other firm intangible assets and 
impact firms’ strategic choices.   
My future research will also conduct detailed analyses on other types 
of domestic firms’ strategic reaction, such as collaborate. How will the entry 
of MNCs impact domestic firms’ choice of collaboration? Who do they 




collaborate and how in turn will political ties affect their collaboration 
outcomes? All these issues are of considerable importance for strategy and 
organization research, and indeed for management, but which have attracted 
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Research Questions: Domestic Firms’ Reaction to Foreign Entry
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Chinese TV Manufacturing Industry, 1993-2004 



































































Figure 4.3  
Foreign Competition in TV Industry, 1993-2003 









































Figure 4.4 Industrial Structure of Chinese TV Manufacturing Industry 
 
 
















Figure 4.5a  
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Table 4.1  
FDI inflows into China (1979-2004) 
 




























Brief Review of Chinese TV Manufacturing Industry 
 
YEAR EVENTS 
Pre-reform Era  
1958 - 1st monochrome TV set produced in China 
1973 - Central government encouraged consumer 
electronics end products;  
- induced first group of entrants, most of which are 
controlled by local government 
Late 1970s - Second group of entrants, most of which are 
under direct control of Ministry of Electronics 
Industry and used to produce military electronic 
goods 
Partial reform Era: 
1980-1992 
 
1980 - Rationing system of monochrome TVs was 
abolished and the distribution was liberalized 
1985 - the Ministry of Electronics Industry appointed 58 
firms as “qualified color TV makers” 
1986 - Liberalization of monochrome TV price 
1991 - Liberalization of color TV price 
- the 58 “qualified color TV makers” were further 
ranked into 3 groups: A(5 firms), B(7 firms), and 
C. 
1992 - Liberalization of production 
Domestic-foreign competition  
1993 - All government controls were abolished; 
- entry of MNCs; 
1996 Domestic manufacturer, Changhong, announced a 
price deduction of 8% - 18% in response to 
aggressive expansion of foreign firms, leading to 
the subsequent price war.  
1998 Foreign firm started to shift to higher-end markets 














Ownership and activity 
Hitachi Fuzhou Hitachi 
(Furi) 
1981 50%-owned joint venture (Japan); 
under strict government restriction 




Thomson 1991 Export-oriented, French-controlled  




1994 50%-owned joint venture (Korea) 
Sanyo Dongguan 
Huaqiang Sanyo 
1995 50%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Started domestic sales from 1998. 
Sony Shanghai Sony 
(Suoguang) 
1995 70%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Matsushita Shangdong 
Matsushita 
1995 50%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Sharp Nanjing Sharp 1996 70%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Toshiba Dalian Toshiba 1996 70%-owned joint venture (Japan) 






Total Annual Exits by Year  
 
Year Firms in 
Industry  
Total Exits Dissolution Acquisition 
1993 87 1 0 1 
1994 122 3 0 3 
1995 156 8 3 5 
1996 185 15 12 3 
1997 195 15 6 9 
1998 181 2 1 1 
1999 210 22 21 1 
2000 207 35 33 2 
2001 170 30 30 0 
2002 152 5 4 1 
2003 143 0 0 0 
Total 330 136 110 26 
 




 Table 4.5 
List of Variables and Definitions 
 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION SOURCES 
DV: Reaction   
Exit A dichotomous variable that took the value of 1 in the year in which a 
firm discontinued its operations either in the TV segment or as a 
corporation, or 0 otherwise. 
- Exit through Acquisition A dichotomous variable that took the value of 1 in the year in which a 
firm discontinued its operations on its own accord, or 0 otherwise 
- Exit through Dissolution A dichotomous variable that took the value of 1 in the year in which 
50% (or above) equity of a firm was acquired, or 0 otherwise 
- China Electronics New (CEN) 
- Wanfang Data Ltd 
- internet sources 
Explanatory Variables   
Political Ties   
Organizational Ties - owned partially or entirely by the government Wanfang Data Ltd 
 - Membership of “qualified TV makers”. An industry-specific 
measure. The “qualified TV maker” group (58 firms) measures an 
important affiliation of a firm with the political institution, and reflects 
the support and intervention the firm receives from the government.  
 
- China Electronics Industry Yearbook 
(CEIY) 





Managerial Ties - Managerial ties are measured as a count variable. A managerial tie is 
recorded if the CEO/Chairman/executives of a firm: 
- is currently serving or used to serve in government (at various 
levels), industrial ministries and bureaus, or regulatory and supporting 
institutions such as tax bureau and other administrative bureaus 
- is a member of the Committee of the Communist Party of China  
- is on the national or regional committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference  
- is a member of the Committee of the National or regional People’s 
Congress 
(1) official websites of the government, 
the legislature and the political party, at 
central, provincial and municipal 
levels;  
(2) China VIPs (the 2003 edition);  
(3) Xinhua News Agency; and  
(4) search on individuals managers of 
sample firms on the internet. 
Central ties Organizational or managerial ties (as described above) at the national 
level 
(1) official websites of the government, 
the legislature and the political party, at 
central, provincial and municipal 
levels;  
(2) China VIPs (the 2003 edition);  
(3) Xinhua News Agency; and  
(4) search on individuals managers of 
sample firms on the internet. 
(5) Wanfang Data Ltd 
Local Ties Organizational or managerial ties (as described above) at the local 
(provincial and municipal) level  
Similar as above for central ties 
Control Variables   
Size Logarithm of total employment of each firm; time varying, measured 
annually 
Wanfang Data Ltd 
Age  Number of years since corporate foundation Wanfang Data Ltd 
Diversified  A count variable counting the number of industries a firm operates in, 
which have different 2-digit SIC code from SIC3651. Time varying, 
measured annually. 




Permit to export A dichotomous variable that indicates whether the domestic firm is 
granted a permit to export 
Wanfang Data Ltd 
Economic Region Seven region indicator variables, taking the value of 1 for firms 
founded within the region or 0 otherwise. Fixed. 
Shanghai Security News  
Industry density Number of local and foreign firms operating in the TV manufacturing 
industry annually 
China Electronics Industry Yearbook  
Foreign direct competition Share of foreign firm’s sales as % of total industry sales value. Time 
varying, measured annually 
China Electronics Industry Yearbook  
(1993 to 2004) 
Import competition Ratio of imported TVs as % of total industry sales value. Time 
varying, measured annually 
China Electronics Industry Yearbook  
(1993 to 2004) 




GDP per capita in each province, autonomous regions and centrally 
administered municipalities. Time varying, measured annually 
China Statistical Yearbook  
Legal effectiveness Number of civil cases filed in central law court annually. Time 
varying, measured annually 
China Statistical Yearbook  
Market development The proportion of the gross output value produced by private firms in 
the economy to that of SOEs. 
China Statistical Yearbook 
Market uncertainty Absolute percentage difference between estimated industry sales and 
realized industry sales. Time varying, measured annually 
China Electronics Industry Yearbook 
(1993 to 2004) 
FDI inflow Total value of foreign direct capital invested in China annually  China Statistical Yearbook  
Year dummies Eleven years are grouped into eight groups to avoid a “perfect failure 
determination” problem, i.e. 0 exit (or acquisition/dissolution) in a 






Descriptive Statistics for Complete Sample (N=1452; Figures and Pearson Correlation Coefficients) 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1. Exit 1                        
2. Dissolution 0.894 1                       
3. Acquisition 0.42 -0.007 1                      
4. SOE 0.024 -0.020 0.093 1                     
5.Qualified 
maker 0.044 -0.035 0.171 0.319 1                    
6. Mgr Tie -0.033 -0.054 0.034 -0.016 -0.019 1                   
7. Local Org 
Tie 0.013 0.027 -0.025 0.127 0.058 -0.059 1                  
8. Central Ogr 
Tie -0.058 -0.051 -0.024 -0.010 -0.057 0.698 -0.048 1                 
9. Local Mgr 
Tie 0.003 -0.037 0.076 0.030 0.030 0.803 -0.048 0.297 1                
10. Local -0.004 -0.008 0.005 0.113 0.058 0.513 0.670 0.170 0.647 1               
11. 
Government 0.020 -0.008 0.063 -0.038 0.099 0.325 -0.025 0.072 0.456 0.274 1              
12. Legislature -0.030 -0.051 0.036 0.005 -0.041 0.869 -0.054 0.686 0.781 0.493 0.098 1             
13. Party -0.022 -0.017 -0.015 -0.019 -0.001 0.572 -0.031 0.456 0.277 0.214 0.077 0.282 1            
14. Age 0.037 0.008 0.059 0.384 0.461 -0.004 0.095 -0.069 0.059 0.120 0.059 0.001 -0.033 1           
15. Size -0.064 -0.097 0.047 0.343 0.293 0.217 -0.079 0.274 0.108 0.027 0.048 0.182 0.146 0.371 1          
16. Diversified -0.071 -0.059 -0.035 0.001 -0.014 0.008 -0.066 0.014 0.001 -0.041 0.055 0.000 -0.007 0.128 0.226 1         
17. Permit -0.022 -0.044 0.049 0.057 0.139 0.168 -0.098 0.170 0.080 -0.003 0.057 0.172 0.074 0.212 0.345 0.221 1        
18. Ind Density 0.158 0.167 0.022 0.045 -0.069 -0.062 0.014 -0.031 -0.060 -0.023 -0.054 -0.045 -0.033 -0.008 -0.051 0.067 0.024 1       
19. % Foreign 
sale 0.114 0.109 0.040 -0.055 -0.078 -0.029 -0.002 -0.005 -0.034 -0.025 -0.034 -0.014 -0.023 -0.010 -0.019 0.018 0.076 0.535 1      
20. % imports -0.058 -0.098 0.073 0.148 0.159 -0.019 0.051 -0.065 -0.001 0.027 0.002 -0.023 -0.022 0.021 -0.018 -0.125 -0.030 -0.222 0.054 1     
21. Provincial 
GDP -0.022 0.015 -0.083 -0.332 -0.231 -0.032 0.315 -0.008 -0.036 0.198 -0.050 -0.011 0.017 -0.097 -0.199 0.063 0.0147 -0.114 0.122 -0.322 1    
22. Case 0.098 0.125 -0.032 -0.137 -0.195 -0.017 -0.037 0.035 -0.031 -0.040 -0.028 -0.003 -0.004 -0.032 -0.051 0.179 0.087 0.765 0.526 -0.461 0.244 1   




24. Uncertainty -0.041 -0.028 -0.046 -0.260 -0.206 0.040 -0.072 0.083 0.018 -0.037 0.024 0.043 0.029 -0.042 -0.0001 0.229 0.116 -0.034 0.392 -0.516 0.481 0.494 0.566 1 
Mean 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.60 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.02 22.46 6.75 0.89 0.18 166.17 0.21 0.03 1.27 5096.1 0.23 44.09 
S.D. 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.49 0.39 0.47 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.11 0.34 0.14 14.22 1.57 1.24 0.38 34.22 0.08 0.03 0.84 534.47 0.19 7.54 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.97 1.61 0 0 87 0.03 0.00 0.12 3414.8 0.02 27.52 
Max. 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 73 11.09 8 1 210 0.33 0.08 5.15 5692.4 0.56 60.63 






Table 5.2  
Log-logistic Estimates of Political Ties and Firm Exit, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to exit) 
 
Variables (1) Baseline  (2) Org Tie (3) Mgr Tie (4) Mgr Tie squared (5) Full 
Age  -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size  0.121*** 0.132*** 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.098*** 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.028) (0.029) (0.037) 
Diversified 0.255*** 0.267*** 0.283*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 
 (0.087) (0.093) (0.085) (0.086) (0.091) 
Permit  -0.073 -0.051 -0.011 -0.003 0.027 
 (0.112) (0 .116) (0.114) (0.115) (0.119) 
% Imports 1.932 3.254 3.599 3.686 4.511* 
 (2.673) (2.786) (2.325) (2.350) (2.509) 
% Foreign sales -3.017*** -3.103*** -3.202*** -3.211*** -3.232*** 
 (0.785) (0.812) (0.749) (0.754) (0.783) 
Industry Density 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FDI inflow  0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
SOE  0.006   0.055 
  (0.105)   (0.099) 
Qualified maker  -0.220*   -0.204* 
  (0.119)   (0.114) 
Mgr Tie    0.058 0.602* 0.584* 
   (0.107) (0.348) (0.353) 
(Mgr Tie)2    -0.223* -0.219* 
    (0.129) (0.131) 
Constant -1.637** -1.763** -1.636*** -1.596** -1.649*** 
 (0.797) (0.771) (0.623) (0.628) (0.632) 
Observations 1452 1452 1452 1452 1452 
Firm # 248 248 248 248 248 
Log likelihood -155.528*** -150.955*** -181.079*** -179.393*** -172.626*** 
 
Dependent variable: survival  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 
* p<0.10;  
** p<0.05;  





Log-logistic Estimates of Political Ties and Firm Exit Mode, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve/be acquired) 
 
Variables  (1) Dissolution Exit (2) Acquisition Exit 
Age  -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Size 0.097** 0.128 
 (0.041) (0.096) 
Diversified 0.366*** 0.109 
 (0.104) (0.197) 
Permit  0.153 -0.179 
 (0.155) (0.213) 
% Imports 9.030** -5.601 
 (3.782) (4.948) 
% Foreign sales -3.743*** -3.096* 
 (0.955) (1.853) 
Industry Density 0.001 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
FDI inflow 0.079*** 0.051* 
 (0.016) (0.029) 
SOE 0.145 -5.884 
 (0.105) (439.956) 
Qualified maker 0.061 -0.782*** 
 (0.143) (0.302) 
Mgr Tie  0.427* -0.228 
 (0.228) (0.156) 
Constant -1.616* 5.736 
 (0.909) (439.961) 
Observations 1356 1035 
Firm # 225 171 
Log likelihood -124.552*** -57.171*** 
                  
                   Dependent variable: survival  
                   Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
                   7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 
                   * p<0.10;  
                   ** p<0.05;  





Exit and Political Ties at National and Local Levels, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to exit/ dissolve/be acquired) 
 
Variables  Exit Exit through Dissolution Exit through Acquisition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age  -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  0.128*** 0.099*** 0.210*** 0.178*** -0.028 -0.052 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.063) (0.069) 
Diversified  0.254*** 0.267*** 0.268** 0.280** 0.287 0.310* 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.110) (0.110) (0.175) (0.184) 
Permit  -0.012 -0.004 0.153 0.161 -0.179 -0.153 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.155) (0.155) (0.213) (0.220) 
% Imports 1.976 2.273 9.765** 9.738** -9.277* -8.269 
 (2.649) (2.634) (4.273) (4.236) (5.225) (5.142) 
% Foreign sales -3.038*** -3.012*** -4.139*** -4.078*** -2.598 -2.582 
 (0.779) (0.776) (1.085) (1.075) (1.698) (1.698) 
Industry Density 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
FDI inflow 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.052* 0.051* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) (0.029) 
Local Org Tie 0.211  0.156  5.244  
 (0.165)  (0.201)  (569.049)  
Central Mgr Tie  4.723  4.659  5.215 
  (258.703)  (239.666)  (338.224) 
Local Mgr Tie  -0.124  0.038  -0.312* 
  (0.125)  (0.310)  (0.159) 
Constant -1.721** -1.536** -2.524** -2.360** 0.631 0.952 
 (0.792) (0.783) (1.051) (1.041) (1.790) (1.800) 
Observations 1452 1452 1356 1356 1035 1035 
Firm # 248 248 225 225 171 171 
Log likelihood -154.667*** -150.778*** -112.311*** -109.964*** -68.444*** -65.866*** 
 
Dependent variable: survival  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 
* p<0.10;  
** p<0.05;  





Exit and Political Ties with Different Destination, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to exit/ dissolve/be acquired) 
 
Variables  Exit Exit through Dissolution Exit through Acquisition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age  -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  0.094*** 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.208*** 0.137*** 0.206*** -0.032 -0.025 -0.018 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) (0.051) (0.036) (0.051) (0.067) (0.065) (0.056) 
Diversified  0.282*** 0.261*** 0.257*** 0.266** 0.327*** 0.268** 0.288 0.275 0.267* 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.111) (0.102) (0.111) (0.183) (0.178) (0.146) 
% Imports 3.976* 1.844 1.896 10.017** 9.430** 9.904** -8.904* -9.270* -24.653*** 
 (2.358) (2.654) (2.671) (4.354) (3.715) (4.330) (5.286) (5.292) (7.841) 
% Foreign sales -3.338*** -2.986*** -2.983*** -4.193*** -3.878*** -4.145*** -2.790 -2.675 0.701 
 (0.760) (0.780) (0.784) (1.111) (0.961) (1.100) (1.748) (1.734) (1.575) 
Industry Density 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
FDI inflow 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.092*** 0.080*** 0.091*** 0.054* 0.053* -0.030 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) 
Government Tie -0.501*   -0.147   -0.678*   
 (0.300)   (0.505)   (0.403)   
Legislature Tie  0.165   0.606*   -0.119  
  (0.161)   (0.361)   (0.159)  
Party Tie   0.227   0.028   3.311 
   (0.366)   (0.418)   (276.419) 
Constant -1.666*** -1.606** -1.614** -2.508** -1.725* -2.476** 0.749 0.657 5.881** 
 (0.624) (0.796) (0.800) (1.056) (0.908) (1.055) (1.824) (1.813) (2.689) 
Observations 1452 1452 1452 1356 1356 1356 1035 1035 1035 



















Dependent variable: survival  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 
* p<0.10;  
** p<0.05;  





Timing of Effects on Exit through Dissolution, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve) 
 
Variables Dissolution(t+1) Dissolution(t+2) Dissolution(t+3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age  -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.000 0.003 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size  0.097** 0.182*** 0.137*** 0.175*** 0.236*** 0.270*** 0.182** 0.281*** 0.244*** 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.036) (0.057) (0.067) (0.068) (0.079) (0.088) (0.066) 
Diversified  0.366*** 0.282*** 0.327*** 0.289** 0.179 0.166 0.309* 0.173 0.228 
 (0.104) (0.108) (0.102) (0.139) (0.146) (0.150) (0.186) (0.192) (0.184) 
% Imports 9.030** 9.582** 9.430** -7.086 -7.667 -7.736 -17.792* -18.678** -19.297** 
 (3.782) (4.181) (3.715) (4.688) (5.270) (5.374) (9.161) (8.897) (9.339) 
% Foreign sales -3.743*** -4.066*** -3.878*** 3.813*** 3.850*** 3.885*** 4.085 4.740* 4.515* 
 (0.955) (1.064) (0.961) (1.286) (1.367) (1.402) (2.588) (2.736) (2.673) 
Industry Density 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014** -0.012* -0.014** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
FDI inflow 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.080*** 0.048** 0.054** 0.056** 0.031 0.036 0.028 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) 
SOE 0.145   0.100   0.183   
 (0.105)   (0.143)   (0.192)   
Qualified maker 0.061   -0.076   0.211   
 (0.143)   (0.197)   (0.285)   
Mgr Tie  0.427*   0.487   6.805   
 (0.228)   (0.298)   (445.458)   
Local Org Tie  0.160   0.168   -0.081  
  (0.197)   (0.267)   (0.326)  
Central Mgr Tie  5.266   6.129   6.722  
  (669.137)   (274.567)   (657.480)  
Local Mgr Tie  0.048   0.056   6.885  
  (0.307)   (0.380)   (546.715)  
Government Tie   -0.147   -0.461   7.593 
   (0.505)   (0.691)   (1,931.000) 
Legislature Tie   0.606*   0.749   7.245 
   (0.361)   (0.461)   (597.417) 
Party Tie   0.028   -0.064   6.338 
   (0.418)   (0.538)   (441.524) 
Constant -1.616* -2.408** -1.725* 0.856 0.413 0.324 1.930 0.695 1.943 
 (0.909) (1.039) (0.908) (1.471) (1.686) (1.705) (3.070) (2.924) (3.095) 
Observations 1356 1356 1356 735 735 735 471 471 471 
Firm # 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 
Log likelihood -124.552*** -109.633*** -130.942*** -148.978*** -137.815*** -140.496*** -101.893*** -96.125*** -94.035*** 
 
Dependent variable: survival  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 
* p<0.10;  
** p<0.05;  





Timing of Effects on Exit through Acquisition, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to be acquired) 
 
Variables Acquisition(t+1) Acquisition(t+2) Acquisition(t+3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size  0.128 -0.053 -0.032 0.182** -0.046 0.002 0.085 -0.006 0.025 
 (0.096) (0.068) (0.067) (0.092) (0.073) (0.061) (0.080) (0.084) (0.061) 
Diversified  0.109 0.316* 0.288 -0.316* -0.098 -0.141 -0.064 0.114 0.054 
 (0.197) (0.184) (0.183) (0.188) (0.163) (0.154) (0.174) (0.240) (0.163) 
% Imports -5.601 -8.288 -8.904* -2.629 -5.847 -3.930 10.036 -1.813 10.323* 
 (4.948) (5.124) (5.286) (2.991) (3.818) (2.768) (6.470) (4.422) (6.054) 
% Foreign sales -3.096* -2.559 -2.790 -5.533*** -4.462** -5.874*** -11.196** -1.157 -11.881** 
 (1.853) (1.685) (1.748) (1.893) (1.748) (1.868) (5.153) (2.619) (4.799) 
Industry Density 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.010** 0.008* 0.010** -0.001 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
FDI inflow 0.051* 0.051* 0.054* 0.114*** 0.102*** 0.128*** 0.272*** 0.090** 0.289*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.099) (0.040) (0.091) 
SOE -5.884   -5.081   -2.899   
 (439.956)   (560.676)   (726.979)   
Qualified maker -0.782***   -0.710**   -0.219   
 (0.302)   (0.277)   (0.183)   
Mgr Tie -0.228   -0.283**   -0.163   
 (0.156)   (0.131)   (0.103)   
Local Ogr Tie  5.181   221.154   160.638  
  (530.766)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Central Mgr Tie  5.326   221.535   161.084  
  (430.422)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Local Mgr Tie  -0.294*   -0.363**   -0.278*  
  (0.157)   (0.149)   (0.158)  
Government Tie   -0.678*   -0.766**   -0.341 
   (0.403)   (0.328)   (0.242) 
Legislature Tie   -0.119   -0.246*   -0.183 
   (0.159)   (0.149)   (0.119) 
Party Tie   3.311   3.722   98.233 
   (276.419)   (382.155)   (0.000) 
Constant 5.736 0.915 0.749 1.613 -1.451 -3.089*** -4.172 -2.007 -7.195*** 
 (439.961) (1.788) (1.824) (560.677) (1.541) (1.101) (726.984) (1.406) (2.197) 
Observations 1035 1035 1035 606 606 606 364 364 364 


















Dependent variable: survival  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 
* p<0.10;  
** p<0.05;  




Table 5.6c  






T+1 T+2 T+3 
Dissolution Exit     
 Total Managerial tie +   
 Local tie    
 Government tie    
 Legislature tie +   
 Party tie    
Acquisition Exit     
 Total Managerial tie  -  
 Local tie - - - 
 Government tie - -  
 Legislature tie  -  






Table 5.7a  
Political Ties and Firm Exit across Economic Regions 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to exit) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) 
Age  -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size  0.126*** 0.155*** 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Diversified 0.263*** 0.207** 0.267*** 0.260*** 0.270*** 0.256*** 0.269*** 0.265*** 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084) 
% Imports 2.692 2.973 3.976* 3.579 3.970* 3.823* 4.062* 3.758* 
 (2.638) (2.648) (2.306) (2.309) (2.315) (2.305) (2.309) (2.278) 
% Foreign sales -2.928*** -2.910*** -3.133*** -3.188*** -3.133*** -3.092*** -3.157*** -3.057*** 
 (0.775) (0.769) (0.741) (0.753) (0.738) (0.734) (0.742) (0.734) 
Industry Density 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FDI inflow 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Provincial GDP 0.047 0.084 0.070 0.067 0.069 0.075 0.068 0.077 
 (0.090) (0.064) (0.056) (0.067) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
SOE -0.101        
 (0.181)        
SOE*GDP 0.093        
 (0.115)        
Qualified maker  -0.265*       
  (0.156)       
Qualified*GDP  0.077       
  (0.133)       
Mgr Tie    -0.461**      
   (0.211)      
Mgr tie*GDP   0.851**      
   (0.413)      
Local Org Tie    1.576     
    (1.080)     
Local org tie*GDP    -0.523     
    (0.372)     
Local Mgr Tie     -0.526***    
     (0.201)    
Local mgr tie*GDP     0.826**    
     (0.407)    
Government Tie      -1.450**   
      (0.628)   
Government*GDP      1.979*   
      (1.185)   
Legislature Tie       -0.571**  
       (0.267)  
Legislature*GDP       0.964**  
       (0.466)  
Party Tie        -0.600 
        (0.941) 
Party*GDP        1.136 
        (1.323) 
Constant -1.640** -1.870** -1.561** -1.746*** -1.561** -1.571** -1.592*** -1.648*** 
 (0.753) (0.756) (0.614) (0.619) (0.621) (0.624) (0.611) (0.606) 
Observations 1452 1452 1452 1452 1452 1452 1452 1452 

















Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 




Table 5.7b  
Political Ties and Dissolution Exit across Economic Regions 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve) 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) 
Age  -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  0.189*** 0.210*** 0.191*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.212*** 0.192*** 0.207*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Diversified  0.311*** 0.250** 0.261** 0.244** 0.256** 0.242** 0.261** 0.251** 
 (0.118) (0.110) (0.109) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) 
% Imports 10.401** 9.593** 9.393** 9.492** 9.668** 9.743** 9.498** 9.657** 
 (4.497) (4.252) (4.179) (4.276) (4.244) (4.238) (4.195) (4.229) 
% Foreign sales -4.091*** -4.001*** -3.911*** -4.138*** -3.990*** -4.059*** -3.973*** -4.010*** 
 (1.106) (1.074) (1.059) (1.109) (1.078) (1.088) (1.063) (1.076) 
Industry Density 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FDI inflow 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Provincial GDP 0.038 0.063 0.062 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.061 0.057 
 (0.104) (0.074) (0.067) (0.083) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) 
SOE 0.060        
 (0.216)        
SOE*GDP 0.035        
 (0.136)        
Qualified maker  0.048       
  (0.228)       
Qualified*GDP  -0.009       
  (0.179)       
Mgr Tie    0.138      
   (0.546)      
Mgr tie*GDP   0.230      
   (0.615)      
Local Org Tie    1.537     
    (1.289)     
Local org*GDP    -0.526     
    (0.442)     
Local Mgr tie     -0.225    
     (0.722)    
Local mgr*GDP     0.529    
     (0.756)    
Government Tie      -2.341   
      (2.912)   
Government*GDP      3.127   
      (4.232)   
Legislature Tie       0.645  
       (0.965)  
Legislature*GDP       -0.143  
       (0.823)  
Party Tie        -0.862 
        (1.043) 
Party*GDP        1.166 
        (1.460) 
Constant -2.388** -2.482** -2.392** -2.613** -2.460** -2.540** -2.435** -2.401** 
 (1.026) (1.040) (1.031) (1.074) (1.028) (1.030) (1.032) (1.039) 
Observations 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356 

















Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 




Table 5.7c  
Political Ties and Acquisition Exit across Economic Regions 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to be acquired) 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) 
Age  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Size  0.022 0.080 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.009 
 (0.057) (0.070) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) 
Diversified  0.205 0.166 0.221 0.222 0.232 0.213 0.229 0.220 
 (0.138) (0.135) (0.162) (0.158) (0.164) (0.158) (0.163) (0.158) 
% Imports -19.820*** -18.190** -5.806 -5.971 -5.797 -5.799 -5.782 -5.824 
 (7.361) (7.430) (4.352) (4.375) (4.367) (4.324) (4.361) (4.320) 
% Foreign sales 0.504 0.309 -2.530* -2.386 -2.515* -2.345 -2.513* -2.378 
 (1.511) (1.563) (1.517) (1.488) (1.505) (1.468) (1.519) (1.481) 
Industry Density -0.005 -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
FDI inflow -0.027 -0.020 0.044* 0.043* 0.043* 0.041 0.044* 0.043* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Provincial GDP 0.248 1.158* 0.493** 0.559** 0.504** 0.545** 0.495** 0.567** 
 (620.441) (0.604) (0.218) (0.231) (0.221) (0.219) (0.220) (0.224) 
SOE -3.845        
 (824.183)        
SOE*GDP 0.131        
 (620.441)        
Qualified maker  0.201       
  (0.351)       
Qualified*GDP  -0.971       
  (0.600)       
Mgr Tie    -0.401      
   (0.308)      
Mgr tie*GDP   0.777      
   (0.712)      
Local Org    4.906     
    (2,687.168)     
Local org*GDP    -0.325     
    (1,179.264)     
Local Mgr Tie     -0.453    
     (0.317)    
Local mgr*GDP     0.656    
     (0.725)    
Government Tie      -1.218   
      (0.879)   
Government*GDP      1.393   
      (1.740)   
Legislature Tie       -0.504  
       (0.392)  
Legislature*GDP       0.913  
       (0.880)  
Party Tie        4.049 
        (920.511) 
Party*GDP        -0.215 
        (730.510) 
Constant 8.258 3.224 -0.027 -0.094 0.057 0.130 -0.002 -0.105 
 (824.188) (2.502) (1.476) (1.471) (1.500) (1.495) (1.481) (1.456) 
Observations 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 
Firm # 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
Log likelihood -49.75*** -44.77*** -63.13*** -64.27*** -62.68*** -62.66*** -63.24*** -64.13*** 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 




Table 5.8 Market Development, Legal Effectiveness, Political Ties and Firm Exit, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve/ be acquired) 
 
Market Development Legal Institution 
Acquisition Exit Dissolution Exit Acquisition Exit Dissolution Exit Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Age  -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size  0.009 0.006 0.002 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.220*** 0.069 0.001 0.010 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.191*** 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.075) (0.074) (0.069) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Diversified  0.136* 0.129 0.141* 0.095* 0.095* 0.089 0.111 0.152 0.144 0.138** 0.137** 0.128** 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.083) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.104) (0.106) (0.101) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) 
Permit  -0.116 -0.098 -0.093 0.019 0.052 0.025 -0.217 -0.135 -0.136 0.047 0.050 0.044 
 (0.132) (0.138) (0.136) (0.160) (0.158) (0.159) (0.196) (0.177) (0.172) (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) 
% Imports 1.500 1.783 1.688 8.797 8.869 8.862 -3.197 -1.588 -2.213 12.288** 12.336** 12.585** 
 (3.061) (3.178) (3.124) (5.510) (5.444) (5.561) (5.271) (4.711) (4.884) (5.057) (5.022) (5.118) 
% Foreign sales -4.674*** -4.883*** -4.761*** -3.941*** -3.932*** -3.960*** -2.982 -2.265 -2.104 -5.179*** -5.186*** -5.309*** 
 (1.282) (1.356) (1.306) (1.428) (1.408) (1.441) (2.192) (2.013) (2.093) (1.340) (1.333) (1.363) 
Industry Density 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.024* -0.027** -0.025** 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FDI inflow 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.089*** -0.030 -0.042 -0.038 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Market Development -0.856*** -0.842*** -0.886*** 0.112 0.087 0.101 -0.856*** -0.842*** -0.886*** 0.112 0.087 0.101 
 (0.250) (0.254) (0.250) (0.191) (0.187) (0.190) (0.250) (0.254) (0.250) (0.191) (0.187) (0.190) 
Legal Institution 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SOE -3.306 -3.522 -4.782 0.117 0.123 0.071 -5.983 -5.413 -6.215 0.126 0.129 0.128 
 (234.485) (369.409) (201.972) (0.136) (0.136) (0.129) (586.358) (875.428) (456.306) (0.129) (0.129) (0.131) 
Mgr Tie  0.111   2.535*   1.597   4.837   
 (0.433)   (1.804)   (1.462)   (7.111)   
Local Tie  0.310   0.447*   -3.164**   5.145  
  (0.653)   (0.606)   (1.534)   (9.850)  
Government Tie   -0.032   3.624   -8.564*   93.802 
   (1.396)   (5.661)   (4.786)   (6,213.1) 
Legislature Tie   0.302   2.692   2.355   -0.655 
   (0.684)   (2.287)   (2.079)   (4.629) 




   (941.805)   (5.737)   (72,201)   (5,176) 
Mgr tie *  market -0.078   -1.113*         
 (0.224)   (0.796)         
Local * market   -0.267   -0.145*        
  (0.355)   (0.343)        
Government * market    -0.246   -1.757       
   (0.784)   (2.494)       
Legislature * market   -0.197   -1.173       
   (0.352)   (1.042)       
Party * market   0.264   -1.794       
   (558.812)   (2.527)       
Mgr tie *  legal       -0.000   -0.001   
       (0.000)   (0.001)   
Local * legal        0.001**   -0.001  
        (0.000)   (0.002)  
Government * legal         0.002**   -0.017 
         (0.001)   (1.091) 
Legislature * legal         -0.001   0.000 
         (0.000)   (0.001) 
Party * legal         0.003   -0.015 
         (13.991)   (0.909) 
Constant -1.492* -1.507* -1.351 -2.444* -2.477** -2.439* 2.122 1.656 2.812 -1.516 -1.496 -1.621 
 (0.874) (0.893) (0.915) (1.255) (1.235) (1.262) (586.362) (875.430) (456.311) (1.282) (1.274) (1.282) 
Observations 1035 1035 1035 1356 1356 1356 1035 1035 1035 1356 1356 1356 
Firm # 171 171 171 225 225 225 171 171 171 225 225 225 












Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 






Market Uncertainty, Political Ties, and Firm Exit, 1993-2003 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve/be acquired) 
 
Variables Total Exit Acquisition Exit Dissolution Exit 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Age  -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size  0.123*** 0.145*** 0.127*** 0.022 0.015 -0.013 0.182*** 0.230*** 0.242*** 
 (0.046) (0.040) (0.043) (0.027) (0.025) (0.040) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) 
Diversified  0.137*** 0.116** 0.116** 0.057 0.068* 0.129* 0.150** 0.110* 0.100* 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.038) (0.038) (0.070) (0.066) (0.059) (0.060) 
Permit  -0.085 -0.058 -0.075 -0.083 -0.072 -0.091 0.074 0.043 0.025 
 (0.126) (0.119) (0.124) (0.060) (0.058) (0.095) (0.183) (0.175) (0.177) 
% Imports 15.894 14.395 13.649 0.365 0.436 -0.229 -1,105.8 -1,089.6 -1,118.9 
 (22.926) (21.405) (22.408) (2.496) (2.695) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Foreign sales -0.039 -0.035 -0.033 -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 322.3*** 316.6*** 325.3*** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (7.055) (6.984) (7.114) 
FDI Inflow -0.498 -0.454 -0.434 -0.039 -0.040 -0.020 -0.792*** -0.779*** -0.801*** 
 (0.687) (0.642) (0.672) (0.077) (0.083) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** -9.812*** -9.639*** -9.906*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.185) (0.188) 
Legal institution -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mkt development 1.232 1.140 1.129 0.086 0.079 -0.168 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (1.620) (1.511) (1.582) (0.250) (0.257) (0.188) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Uncertainty  7.537 7.186 6.696 -0.494 -0.402 -0.310 22.122*** 21.738*** 22.358*** 
 (8.130) (7.599) (7.955) (1.324) (1.384) (0.909) (0.779) (0.770) (0.785) 
SOE -48.676 -44.498 -41.197 -3.471 -3.535 -9.398** 0.124 0.124 0.124 
 (74.338) (69.680) (72.807) (8.502) (9.093) (4.112) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Mgr Tie 0.244   -0.001   0.228*   
 (0.177)   (0.060)   (0.242)   
Local Tie  -0.446**   -0.173*   0.093  
  (0.192)   (0.144)   (0.287)  
Government Tie   -3.250**   -0.487   6.415 
   (1.629)   (0.443)   (325.612) 
Legislature Tie   -0.909**   -0.185   0.320 
   (0.449)   (0.187)   (0.352) 
Party Tie   0.169   58.144   -0.107 
   (1.072)   (0.000)   (0.539) 
SOE*uncertainty -1.709   -0.441   -1.509   
 (1.206)   (3,798.93)   (1.606)   
Qualified*uncertainty -1.297   -0.398   -1.797   
 (0.848)   (0.596)   (0.148)   
Mgr tie * uncertainty -0.684   -0.038   -0.501   
 (0.702)   (0.367)   (1.389)   
Local * uncertainty  -1.776**   -0.518*   -1.886  
  (0.903)   (0.555)   (1.487)  
Govt * uncertainty   17.619   1.809   77.733 
   (14.236)   (4.182)   (3,501) 
Legisl * uncertainty   -2.444**   -0.502   -1.952 
   (1.156)   (0.661)   (1.650) 
Party * uncertainty   1.765   3,218   -1.185 
   (6.127)   (0.000)   (3.628) 
Constant 21.298 19.400 18.462 1.619 -0.396 2.302 118.56*** 116.54*** 120.75*** 
 (30.614) (28.640) (29.954) (0.000) (3.450) (0.000) (2.231) (2.198) (45.572) 
Observations 1452 1452 1452 1035 1035 1035 1356 1356 1356 
Firm # 248 248 248 171 171 171 225 225 225 
Log likelihood -149.16*** -145.19*** -148.37*** -36.654*** -35.278*** -34.248*** -132.47*** -123.19*** -131.86*** 
           Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
           7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 





Robustness Check: Adding (Predicted) Prior Performance in the Model 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve/be acquired) 
 
 (1) Exit (2) Dissolution (3) Acquisition 
Diversified 0.122** 0.148** 0.097 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.103) 
Permit  -0.038 0.095 -0.212 
 (0.118) (0.164) (0.201) 
% Imports 4.681* 11.897** -0.770 
 (2.611) (5.002) (4.487) 
% Foreign Sales -3.089*** -5.026*** -1.657 
 (0.830) (1.310) (2.047) 
Industry Density -0.000 0.011* -0.025* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) 
FDI Inflow 0.074*** 0.124*** -0.038 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.045) 
Case  0.000 -0.001* 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Market Uncertainty 0.048 0.142 -4.961 
 (0.104) (0.121) (586.115) 
SOE  -0.177 0.069 -0.626** 
 (0.110) (0.154) (0.252) 
Mgr Tie 0.092 0.331* -0.047 
 (0.126) (0.236) (0.134) 
Prior Performance (predicted) 0.100*** 0.096** 0.085 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.070) 
Constant -2.077*** -0.759 1.493 
 (0.731) (1.217) (586.118) 
Observations 1452 1356 1035 
Firm # 248 225 171 
Log likelihood -156.028*** -110.622*** -47.235*** 
 
           Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
           7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constraint 




Table 5.11  
Robustness Check: Measuring Managerial Ties as a Dummy Variable 
(positive coefficient = more likely to survive = less likely to dissolve/be acquired) 
 
 (1) Exit (2) Dissolution (3) Acquisition 
Size  0.100*** 0.097** 0.148 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.098) 
Diversified 0.122*** 0.147*** 0.063 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.100) 
Permit  0.016 0.155 -0.215 
 (0.118) (0.155) (0.205) 
% Imports 4.704* 10.507** -2.103 
 (2.502) (4.175) (4.766) 
% Foreign Sales -3.241*** -4.538*** -2.607 
 (0.803) (1.113) (2.044) 
Industry Density 0.001 0.010* -0.021 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) 
FDI Inflow 0.074*** 0.111*** -0.020 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.043) 
Case  0.000 -0.001* 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Market Uncertainty 0.079 0.178 -5.177 
 (0.100) (0.111) (368.921) 
SOE  -0.224** 0.027 -0.678** 
 (0.114) (0.152) (0.267) 
Mgr Tie Dummy 0.188 0.487* -0.170 
 (0.187) (0.286) (0.262) 
Constant -1.835** -0.836 1.868 
 (0.734) (1.091) (368.926) 
Observations 1452 1356 1035 
Firm # 248 225 171 
Log likelihood  -174.728*** -125.354*** -53.277*** 
 
           Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
           7 Region and 8 Year dummies are not presented due to space constant 




 Table 5.12  
Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 




H1 Political Ties and exit  X  
H2 Mode of exit X   
H3 Organizational vs. managerial ties  X  
H4 Destinations with different 
resources: Local vs. Central ties   X 
 Destinations with different 
resources: Power sources of ties X   
H5 “Until when” X   
H6 “Since when” X   
H7 Moderation: Regional Economic 
development  X  
H8 Moderation: Legal effectiveness  X  
H9 Moderation: Market uncertainty X   
 
 
